INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND
THE ECONOMICS OF BUSINESS STRATEGY
Raymond DE BONDT and Jan VANDEKERCKHOVE
Abstract
Industrial organization (IO) has an important role to play in inspiring the competition and regulation policies of the government. At the same it can be used to clarify the economics of business strategies. The idea here is not to give a comprehensive review, but to draw attention to some striking tendencies, prospects and problems of the field of IO as a source of inspiration for competitive strategies. A first focus will be on credible market strategies and asymmetric information, with implications for internal organization, vertical foreclosure and markets with switching costs. A second point will look at detection of not so obvious possibilities, as there are lower prices with cooperation, disadvantageous mergers, positive side effects for rivals, and disadvantageous price discrimination. Finally some approaches will be discussed to problems concerning high requirements on rationality and lack of robustness. An example will be discussed of a search for robustness in strategic investment models in oligopoly settings with leaders and followers.
Keywords: Industrial Organization, Business Strategies, Asymmetric Information
The Consensus Value for Games in Partition Function
Yuan Ju
Abstract
This paper studies a generalization of the consensus value (cf. Ju, Borm and Ruys (2004)) to the class of partition function form games. The concepts and axioms, related to the consensus value, are extended. This value is characterized as the unique function that satisfies efficiency, complete symmetry, the quasi-null player property and additivity. By means of the transfer property, a second characterization is provided. Moreover, it is shown that this value satisfies the individual rationality under a certain condition, and well balances the tradeoff between coalition effects and externality effects. By modifying the stand-alone reduced game, a recursive formula for the value is established. A further generalization of the consensus value is discussed. Finally, two applications of the consensus value are given: one is for oligopoly games in partition function form and the other is about participation incentives in free-rider situations.
JEL classification codes:C71; C72; D43; D62.
Keywords:partition function form games; coalition structure; Shapley value; consensus value
Coordinating R&D Race through Patent Licensing
Ping Lin
Abstract
This paper explores the extend to which patent licensing can internalize the externalities in patent race models which causeexcessive R&D expenditures”. In a variation of Lee and Wilde [1980] model with both ex ante and ex post licensing, the following results are obtained: (i) with ex ante licensing agreement, the Nash equilibrium of the R&D race coincides with the cooperative rate of R&D; (ii) ex ante licensing can occur even when it reduces the collective profits of the licenser and the licensee ex post; and (iii) ex post licensing always speeds up innovation relative to the case of no-licensing.
Keywords: R&D race, Patent Licensing
Banking industry liberalization, franchise values and deposits mobilization: evidence from international panel data
James Laurenceson
Abstract
Banking industry liberalization in China has gained pace. The theoretical underpinning of this policy approach is the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis, which contends that a liberalized financial sector will maximize the quantity of deposits mobilized and optimize the efficiency with which these funds are allocated amongst competing investments. However,disparate country experiences with the process of financial liberalization have prompted the emergence of alternative theoretical paradigms. One theory that has been proposed argues that through reducing bank franchise values, liberalization may have the effect of reducing the quantity of deposits mobilized. Drawing on an extensive international panel data set, the empirical analysis conducted in this paper suggests that, contrary to this hypothesis, bank franchise values are either unrelated, or negatively related, to deposits mobilization. Nevertheless, the process of banking industry liberalization still poses immense challenges for policy-makers in China, and the extent to which these challenges are adequately met will go a long way to determining whether the transition to a market economy is successfully completed.
Key words– Financial Liberalization, Franchise Values, Deposits Mobilization
International Infrastructure: Neglected at Our Peril
Sanford Berg
Abstract
This paper describes the constellation of factors affecting infrastructure investments and utility operations. Independent regulatory commissions exercise most direct control over two factors: governance (agency design and processes) and regulatory policies (or incentives). Other factors are generally outside the regulatory domain but may influence or be influenced by regulatory governance and policies. These other factors include institutional conditions, national experience, perceptions of risk, and industry conditions—as they affect the structure, behavior, and performance of utilities. In addition, corporate governance determines the way private and public suppliers provide information and respond to incentives. Ultimately, the legitimacy and credibility of the regulatory system depends on how closely infrastructure performance matches realistic national objectives. Weak performance does not bode well for global security in the future.
Keywords: Infrastructure Investments, Governance, Regulatory Policies
A Multiple Account Framework for Cost-Benefit Analysis
Harry F. Campbell and Richard P.C. Brown
Abstract
The paper presents a spreadsheet-based multiple account framework for cost-benefit analysis which incorporates all the usual concerns of cost-benefit analysts such as shadow-pricing to account for market failure, distribution of net benefits, sensitivity and risk analysis, cost of public funds, and environmental effects. The approach is generalizable to a wide range of projects and situations and offers a number of advantages to both analysts and decision-makers, including transparency, a check on internal consistency, and a detailed summary of project net benefits disaggregated by stakeholder group. Of particular importance is the ease with which this framework allows for a project to be evaluated from alternative decision-making perspectives and under alternative policy scenarios where the trade-offs among the project’s stakeholders can readily be identified and quantified.
Key words: Cost-benefit Analysis, Benefit-cost Analysis, Multiple Account, Spreadsheet Evaluation, Public Sector Project, Private Sector Project, Efficiency Analysis, Referent Group Analysis, Income Distribution, Environmental Costs.
产品生命周期与价格战行为
史宇鹏
摘要 在产业组织理论中,对寡头之间定价行为进行研究由来已久。随着博弈论的发展,经济学家们开始用重复博弈来研究寡头之间的价格联盟和价格战,他们往往把价格战归因于市场需求的不确定性。和以往的研究不同,本文是从产品的生命周期角度来研究价格战行为,在一个非常一般化的完全信息重复博弈中来分析寡头降价行为的激励。作者把产品生命周期分为成长期和衰退期,通过研究表明:(1)即使寡头之间存在合谋,在产品的衰退期,降价也是它的最优选择(2)在产品的成长期,需求曲线斜率的变动会导致合谋价格可升可降;如果需求在衰退期下降缓慢,那么在整个成长期厂商都不会背离价格合谋(3)在产品的衰退期,如果市场需求下降缓慢,厂商数目符合一定条件,那么发动价格战是企业的最优选择。因此,根据模型的结论,在不存在不确定因素的条件下,如果市场需求下降缓慢,价格战行为应当在产品需求萎缩的情况下观察到。在文章的最后部分,作者采用了中国彩电行业的数据对模型的有效性进行了初步的研究。
关键词 产品生命周期,价格战,重复博弈
JEL Classification: D430,L120,M310
The Product Life Cycle and Interfirm Price Wars
Shi Yupeng
(Guanghua School of Management,Peking University)
Abstract:Economists have been studying price decisions of oligopolies since long time ago. They study interfirm price wars with the tools of repeated games recently, and attribute price wars to uncertainties of demand. This paper presents another perspective of this phenomena and focuses on the product life cycle. It studies oligopolies’ incentives to motivate price wars under a very general setting of repeated game with complete information The author shows: (1) under the assumption of product life cycle, it’s optimal of oligopolies to charge lower prices in the decline stage of product life cycle, even when they collude (2) the collusive price will go up or down during the growth stage of product life cycle when the slope of the demand curve fluctuates and no firm will deviate from collusion when the demand recede slowly (3) the deviator will get positive profit in the decline stage of product life cycle when demand recedes slowly in the beginning of the decline stage. As a result, prices wars should be observed during the decline stage of product life cycle. The author uses some facts of the color TV industry of China to testify his theory in the end part of the paper.
Keywords: Product Life Cycle. Price Wars. Repeated Game
JEL Classification: D430,L120,M310
织理论演变与实验经济学的影响
卜国琴 张耀辉 卢云峰
摘要:长期以来,产业组织理论一直围绕着厂商结构和厂商行为开展研究,对市场交易行为并没有给予充分的重视,这在很大程度上影响了我国对产业组织理论的理解和规制制定。实验经济学方法的普及,使很多涉及交易的难题得到解决,取得了大量重要的研究成果,这一进展将改变产业组织理论的研究重点,成果的应用也在改变着人们对规制的理解,并提出市场设计等一系列重要概念。本文将实验经济学与产业组织理论结合,解决主流产业组织理论比较忽视的市场交易问题,力图对产业组织理论研究对象和研究方法实现突破,以推动产业组织理论向以市场设计为主的思路转变。
关键词:产业组织 实验经济学 市场设计市场交易制度
JEL classification: L000, L190, C900
The evolvement of industrial organization theory and the influence of experimental economics
Bu Guoqing Zhang Yaohui Lu Yunfeng
Abstract:For a long time, industrial organization theory has focused on firm structure and firm behavior for research and the main schools in this field have not paid enough attention to market exchange behavior.This will hamper the theoretical understanding of industrial organization and the stipulation of governmental regulations.With the popularization of experimental economics,so many problems relevant to exchange have been solved and so many research achievements have been gained.This progress will change the researching emphases of industrial organization and the application of these achievements will also change the understanding of regulations.As a result,market design and some other concepts have been put forward.This article will resolve the problem of market exchange which is ignored by the mainstream of industrial organization theory by combining experimental economics and industrial organization theory,and strive to make a breakthrough in research objectives and research methods of industrial organization theory in order to promote its transformation to market design.
Keywords: industrial organization,experimental economics,market design,trading institutions
JEL classification: L000, L190, C900
产业结构演进理论适用性分析——以南宁市为例
方草
摘 要:本文以南宁市的产业结构现状为案例,探讨了广泛应用于地区和城市产业发展研究的产业结构演进理论的适用性,并根据南宁市的具体情况提出了相应的政策建议,得出了与以往的研究不同的结论。本文第一部分从GDP结构、就业结构、固定资产投资结构三方面分析了现阶段南宁市产业结构发展的基本状况。第二部分是本文的核心,考察了产业结构演进理论应用于城市研究的适用性以及南宁市产业结构发展特点背后的原因,并对南宁市产业结构发展现状的合理性做出评价。最后是结论和进一步的讨论。
关键字:城市产业结构 产业结构演进 南宁市产业结构
An analysis on the adaptability of the industrial structure theory——Nanning Case
Cao Fang
Abstract:in this paper we take the case of Nanning to explore the prevalent applied theory in researches of city industrial development—the theory of stages of industrialization. We also derive some explicit policy advices from our research. In part 1, we generally describe the situation of current industrial structure of Nanning from three different angles: the GDP structure, the employment structure and the investment structure. In part 2, which is the core of the paper, we discuss the adaptability of the industrialization stage theory in the application of city researches. Further, in this part we try to make a plausible and on-the-ground assessment of the current situation of Nanning’s industrial structure. And of course in the end our conclusion and some further discussion.
Keywords:Industrial structure of a city Theory of industrialization stages Adaptability
JEL classification: L000, O000, O180
产业集群与产业竞争力
陈柳钦
摘 要:产业集群是一种世界性的经济现象。产业集群竞争力理论随着产业集群的不断发展而相应地演变成系统的理论体系。鉴于产业竞争力的交叉性和递阶层次性,产业集群就成为产业竞争力提升的关键。我国产业集群发展还在起步阶段,通过产业集群来促进产业竞争力提升,需要政府“有所为,有所不为。”
关键词:产业;产业集群;产业竞争力;
Industrial Clusters and Industry Competition Capacity
Chen Liuqin
( Tianjin Academy of Social Science , Tianjin, 300191)
Abstract: Industrial Clusters are a sort of cosmopolitan economy phenomenon.The theories of industrial clusters competition capacity are accordingly evolving into systemic system info along with industrial clusters’ development. Whereas the interlace and administrative levels of industrial clusters competition capacity, industrial clusters at once become the key of advancing industry competition capacity. Industrial Clusters are still at the initial stages of its phases,To exalt the industry competition capacity by industrial clusters needs government to do something ,not to do something.
Keywords:Industry ;Industrial Clusters; Industry Competition Capacity;
“产业经济与规制理论及政策国际学术研讨会”综述
臧旭恒 杜传忠
2004年10月30-31日,由山东大学经济学院、山东大学产业经济研究所、《中国工业经济》编辑部及《产业经济评论》编辑部联合举办的“产业经济与规制理论及政策”国际学术研讨会,在山东大学隆重举行,来自美国、日本、荷兰、澳大利亚及香港等国家和地区,以及国内高校、研究机构的产业经济研究专家、学者和政府部门的官员共80余人参加了会议。会议共收到论文60余篇,其中20余位专家学者作了大会发言。本次研讨会围绕产业经济与政府规制理论的前沿发展、中国转轨时期的垄断产业改革和产业发展、新经济条件下的产业组织等问题进行了研讨。现将会议发言及征文的主要观点作一综述。