产能过剩卡特尔的豁免适用分析
钟刚 赵诚皓
摘 要：我国部分行业出现“内卷式”竞争的深层原因是供给侧存在严重的结构性产能过剩。与直接实施去产能的产业政策不同，豁免产能过剩卡特尔是在反垄断法框架下针对“内卷式”竞争的治理路径，这并非对市场机制的否定，而是在特定发展阶段对市场机制的补充与完善，坚持了竞争政策的基础性地位，具有独特的现实价值。我国目前产能过剩卡特尔的豁免适用在适用标准与实施机制方面存在双重困境。对此，在适用标准层面，应明确产能过剩卡特尔豁免的适用前提与界限，同时为具体四类豁免要件的内涵提供初步解析。在实施机制层面，建议确立事前审查的豁免审查模式，豁免申报主体应限缩于生产者及生产者所属的行业协会，并辅之以保障与监督措施。
关键词：产能过剩 “内卷式”竞争 反垄断豁免 适用标准 实施机制
Analysis of The Application of Exemptions to Overcapacity Cartels
Gang Zhong Chenghao Zhao
Abstract：The deep reason for the Involution competition in some industries of our country is the serious structural overcapacity on the supply side. Different from the industrial policy of cutting overcapacity directly, the exemption of overcapacity cartel is a governance path aimed at involution competition under the framework of the anti-monopoly law. This is not a denial of the market mechanism; rather, it is a supplement and improvement of the market mechanism at a specific stage of development. It upholds the fundamental position of the competition policy and holds unique practical value. At present, the exemption of overcapacity cartel in our country faces double dilemma of applicable standard and implementing mechanism. In this regard, at the level of applicable standards, we should clarify the premise and limit of the application of the overcapacity cartel exemption, and provide a preliminary analysis of the connotation of the specific four types of exemption requirements. At the level of implementation mechanism, the implementation mechanism of the agreement requires the establishment of the exemption review mode of prior review, and the exemption application subjects should be limited to producers and the industry associations to which producers belong, supplemented by safeguard and supervision measures.
Keywords：Overcapacity Involution Competition Antitrust Exemption Applicable Standards Mechanism of Implementation
JEL Classification：K21 L41
纵向产业链视野下选择性补贴政策的福利效应与最优补贴策略
张 博
摘 要：推动科技创新是驱动新质生产力发展的核心途径，而政府科学制定创新激励政策对于促进科技创新起着至关重要的作用。本文构建纵向市场企业研发竞争模型，分析政府仅补贴上游低成本供应商的扶强式选择性研发补贴政策的竞争效应和社会福利效应，并探讨最优的研发补贴政策。本文发现，仅补贴上游低成本供应商的扶强式选择性研发补贴政策会扭曲上游供应商市场的竞争，当补贴力度超过补贴阈值后，补贴后的社会总福利反而差于补贴前；上游供应商之间的技术溢出效应越小、上游低成本供应商的数量越少、下游厂商数量越多，政府仅补贴上游低成本供应商后的社会福利低于补贴前的可能性越大；当技术溢出效应小于0.5时，能够最大化社会福利的最优研发补贴政策要求政府对上游高成本供应商的补贴力度高于低成本供应商，而当技术溢出效应大于0.5后，能够最大化社会福利的最优研发补贴政策要求政府对上游高成本供应商的补贴力度低于低成本供应商。本文为研发补贴政策的科学评估与制定提供理论支撑。
关键词：选择性研发补贴政策 竞争效应 福利效应 最优研发补贴政策
Welfare Effects of Selective R&D Subsidy Policies and Optimal Subsidy
Strategy From the Perspective of Vertical Industry Chain
Bo Zhang
Abstract: Promoting scientific and technological innovation is the core pathway for driving the development of new productive forces, and the government's scientific formulation of innovation incentive policies plays a crucial role in fostering such innovation. This paper constructs a dynamic R&D competition model to analyze the competitive effects and social welfare impacts of a selective subsidy policy where the government exclusively subsidizes upstream low-cost suppliers. It further explores the optimal R&D subsidy policy. The findings reveal that selective R&D subsidies favoring only upstream low-cost suppliers distort competition in the upstream supplier market. When subsidy intensity exceeds a threshold, total social welfare post-subsidy becomes worse than pre-subsidy. The likelihood of post-subsidy welfare being lower than pre-subsidy increases under conditions of smaller technological spillover effects among upstream suppliers, fewer low-cost upstream suppliers, and a larger number of downstream manufacturers. When the technological spillover effect is less than 0.5, the optimal R&D subsidy policy that maximizes social welfare requires the government to subsidize high-cost upstream suppliers more than low-cost suppliers. Conversely, when the spillover effect exceeds 0.5, the optimal policy requires subsidizing high-cost suppliers less than low-cost suppliers. This study provides theoretical support for the scientific evaluation and formulation of R&D subsidy policies.
Keywords: Selective R&D Subsidy Policy Competition Effect Welfare Effect Optimal R&D Subsidy Policy
JEL Classification: D610 L11 L52
非专利实施主体的司法救济偏好与社会福利效应研究
洪结银
摘 要：在专利侵权诉讼中，由于非专利实施主体（NPEs）不会面临反诉的威胁，因而禁令救济通常被认为是NPEs主张专利权利的强有力“武器”。本文基于罗纳德˙科斯的“损害的相互性”思想，构建专利许可的讨价还价博弈模型，对NPEs司法救济偏好进行比较研究。研究发现，NPEs对不同救济制度的偏好取决于其持有的专利的创新价值的大小。对于小幅度增量创新，NPEs偏好于禁令救济制度，而对于价值更高的创新，NPEs则更加偏好于费用救济制度。这说明禁令救济制度必然有利于NPEs的直观结论并不必然成立。就两种救济制度社会福利效应而言，在较小的增量创新情形，费用救济制度优于禁令制度；在较大的增量创新、中间创新和剧烈创新情形，禁令制度优于费用救济制度。本文的研究结论对专利司法救济制度的合理选择具有学理上的参考价值。
关键词：非专利实施主体 禁令救济制度 费用救济制度 讨价还价
A Study on the Judicial Relief Preferences of Non-Practicing Entities and Their Social Welfare Effects
Jieyin Hong
Abstract：In patent infringement litigation, injunctive relief is often considered a powerful "weapon" for non-practicing entities (NPEs) to assert patent rights, as NPEs do not face the threat of counterclaims. This paper constructs a bargaining game model for patent licensing based on Ronald Coase's concept of “reciprocal harm,” conducting a comparative study on the judicial remedy preferences of NPEs. The research indicates that NPEs' preference for different relief systems depends on the innovative value of the patents they hold. For incremental innovations of lesser significance, NPEs favor injunction relief systems, whereas for higher-value innovations, NPEs show a stronger preference for cost relief systems. This demonstrates that the intuitive conclusion that injunction relief systems inherently favor NPEs is not necessarily true. Regarding the social welfare effects of the two relief systems, the cost relief system outperforms the injunction system under minor incremental innovation scenarios; In cases of significant incremental innovation, intermediate innovation, and drastic innovation, the injunction system is superior to the cost relief system. The findings of this study provide theoretical reference value for the rational selection of patent judicial relief systems.
Keywords: Non-Practicing Entities Injunction Relief System Fee Relief System Bargaining
JEL Classification: C78 D45
威慑理论视角下我国反垄断个人罚款责任研究
姜厚辰 王健
摘 要：传统威慑理论认为，可以通过对企业施加反垄断罚款促使企业对其内部的违法人员进行治理，进而实现个人威慑。但实践证明，企业所承担的违法成本难以直接传递给个人，只有将反垄断法律责任直接施加在个人身上，才能实现对违法个人的有效威慑。我国《反垄断法》针对经营者的垄断协议行为构建了反垄断个人罚款责任制度，该责任在性质上应被理解为经营者责任的加重责任，具有附属性，其功能在于强化威慑效果，弥补单一经营者处罚可能产生的威慑不足问题。在补充威慑目标下，个人罚款责任的启动应当优先考虑经营者行为，以经营者严重违法并已经受到处罚为前提。对于严重性的判断，可以从行为性质与损害后果两方面进行综合考量。
关键词：威慑理论 反垄断罚款 个人罚款 加重责任 补充威慑
Research on Personal Anti-monopoly Fines in China under the Deterrence Theory
Houchen Jiang Jian Wang
Abstract：According to traditional deterrence theory, anti-monopoly fines imposed on enterprises can compel them to discipline internal personnel involved in illegal conduct, thereby achieving individual deterrence. However, practice has shown that the costs of violations borne by enterprises are difficult to directly pass on to individuals. Only by directly imposing anti-monopoly legal liability on individuals can effective deterrence against wrongdoers be achieved. China's Anti-Monopoly Law establishes a system of personal fines liability for monopolistic agreement conduct by undertakings. In nature, this liability should be understood as an aggravated form of the undertaking's liability, with ancillary characteristics. Its function is to strengthen the deterrent effect and compensate for possible insufficient deterrence resulting from solely penalizing the undertaking. Under the objective of complementary deterrence, the imposition of personal fines should prioritize consideration of the undertaking's conduct, and be premised on the undertaking having committed serious violations and already been penalized. The assessment of seriousness can be comprehensively evaluated from both the nature of the conduct and the extent of the harm caused.
Keywords：Deterrence Theory Anti-monopoly Fines Personal Fines Aggravated Liability Complementary Deterrence
JEL Classification: L40 K42
算法“黑暗模式”侵害消费者选择权的规范定性与制度调适
汪文涵
摘 要：算法驱动的“黑暗模式”以隐蔽、诱导或强制等方式，引导或改变消费者的自主决策，对消费者选择权保护的规范适用带来制度冲击。当前的研究多基于风险规制视角，依赖多个法律条款的耦合实施预防性监管，导致监管泛化和规制不足，已难以应对该行为逐渐泛滥和针对性监管的需求，亟待转向规范定性和制度调适的规范建构视角进行突破。考虑到法律的前瞻性规制对该行为的包容性治理，法律属性上更宜将该行为纳入不公平商业行为的范畴，遵循传统消费者选择权保护路径，视情节认定其法律性质涉及构成欺诈、欺骗与误导或强制交易。在厘清预防性监管框架规制疏漏的基础上，手段维度，确立“设计公平”的一般规则，并以网络平台服务经营者是否违反“专业勤勉义务”为判断标准；结果维度，引入“合理预期”标准，判断该行为产生的“不确定性”损害后果是否属于“实质损害”。
关键词：算法 黑暗模式 消费者选择权 设计公平 实质损害
Normative Characterization and Institutional Adaptation of Algorithmic “Dark Patterns” Infringing on Consumers’ Right to Choice
Wenhan Wang
Abstract: Algorithm-driven “dark patterns” covertly guide or alter consumer’ autonomous decisions through deception, manipulation, or coercion, posing systemic challenges to the application of regulations protecting consumer choice. Current research predominantly adopts a risk-based regulatory perspective, relying on the combined implementation of multiple legal provisions for preventive oversight. This approach has led to regulatory overreach and inadequate regulation, rendering it increasingly ineffective in addressing the growing prevalence of such practices and the need for targeted regulation. It is imperative to break through by shifting to a perspective of normative construction that focuses on regulatory characterization and institutional adaptation. Considering the need for forward-looking legal regulation to achieve inclusive governance of this behavior, it is more appropriate to classify it as an unfair commercial practice. Following the traditional path of consumer choice protection, its legal nature should be determined based on the circumstances, potentially constituting fraud, deception, misleading practices, or forced transactions. Building upon clarifying regulatory gaps in the preventive oversight framework, measures dimension should establish a general rule of “Fairness by Design”, and using whether online platform service operators violate their “professional duty of care” as the judgment criterion. On the outcome dimension, the “reasonable expectation” standard should be introduced to determine whether the ‘uncertainty’ damages resulting from such conduct constitute “substantive harm.”
Keywords: Algorithm Dark Pattern Consumers’ Right To Choice Fairness By Design Substantial Harm
JEL Classification: K23 D18
全国统一大市场赋能新质生产力发展的政治经济学分析
李玉梅 韩峰 谢新跃
摘 要：理解全国统一大市场对于发展新质生产力的重要意义，可以在生产力发展的动态过程和逻辑机理中得到有益启发。基于马克思生产力理论与熊彼特创新理论的共同指向，生产力实现“跃迁”的核心机制在于创新对生产要素的突破性重组。这种生产力的质变必然重塑社会分工结构，推动分工体系向更高层次演进，而分工体系的动态变迁又进一步推动了市场形态的扩展，促使市场形态从区域化、碎片化向一体化、高级化演进。因此，本文尝试提出一个由创新推动分工体系与市场形态在更高层次上实现结构性适配的“正反金字塔”模型。基于这一模型，生产力发展过程中创新来源不稳定与创新实现不确定的双重锁定与产品市场和要素市场发展的结构性失衡密切相关，打通全国统一大市场赋能新质生产力的实践堵点，客观上要求全国统一大市场主动塑造产品市场与要素市场以及两个市场间的制度机制，提供与新质生产力相适应的发展环境，以发挥创新主体在生产力不同发展阶段的能动作用，贯通生产力发展的全过程。
关键词：全国统一大市场 新质生产力 正反金字塔 双重锁定
A Political Economy Analysis of the National Unified Large Market Empowering the Development of New Productive Forces
Yumei Li Feng Han Xinyue Xie
Abstract: To grasp the significance of the national unified large market for the development of new productive forces, valuable insights can be drawn from the the dynamic process and logical mechanism of productivity development.. Based on the shared orientation of Marx’s theory of productive forces and Schumpeter’s innovation theory, the core mechanism underlying the qualitative leap of productive forces lies in the groundbreaking reorganization of production factors enabled by innovation. This qualitative transformation of productive forces inevitably reshapes the structure of the social division of labor, propelling the division of labor system toward higher-level evolution; in turn, the dynamic evolution of the division of labor system further expands market forms, driving their transition from regionalized, fragmented states to integrated, advanced ones. Accordingly, this paper attempts to propose a “positive-negative pyramid” model, in which innovation facilitates the structural alignment between the division of labor system and market forms at a higher level. Drawing on the above theoretical model, the dual lock-in (characterized by unstable innovation sources and uncertain innovation realization) in the development of productive forces is closely associated with the structural imbalance between the advancement of product markets and factor markets. To address the practical bottlenecks in how the national unified large market empowers new productive forces, it is objectively necessary for the national unified large market to proactively shape the institutional mechanisms governing product markets, factor markets, and the interface between the two, and to provide a development environment compatible with new productive forces. This will enable innovation entities to exert their dynamic role across different stages of productive forces development and facilitate the seamless progression of the entire productive forces advancement process.
Keywords: National Unified Large Market New Productive Forces Positive-Negative Pyramid Dual Lock-in
JEL Classification: B14 B15
排他性交易、平台跨界与市场势力传导
鲁彦
摘 要：跨界扩张已成为平台增强竞争优势的常态性行为，其成功与否取决于平台对跨界扩张方式的选择。本文对平台跨界扩张的方式——排他性交易进行研究，对该方式的机理及后果的评估逻辑进行剖析，并结合多案例进行验证分析。研究表明：平台跨界中的排他性交易通过用户锁定与迁移效应促进业务之间的协同，进而实现市场势力的跨界传导。在判定平台跨界中排他性交易的后果时，需对该行为的静态和动态两个层面的正向、负向影响进行分析，权衡之后综合判定其对市场竞争和消费者福利的影响。相较而言，单一业务型平台体现为对特定市场的影响，而生态系统型平台则体现为对多个市场的影响。平台借助排他性交易下市场势力的跨界传导可显著增强市场竞争优势，但平台依赖于此而不以持续性创新致力于产品（服务）的质量提升，则会扭曲市场竞争，最终使排他性交易沦为平台跨界垄断的手段。其中，生态系统型平台的排他性交易因影响范围更广、传导的市场势力更强而更易于形成跨界垄断。
关键词：平台经济 排他性交易 平台跨界 跨界垄断 生态系统
Exclusive Dealing, Platform Cross-border Expansion, and the Transmission of Market Power
Yan Lu
Abstract: Cross-border expansion has become the normal behavior for platforms to enhance their competitive advantages, and its success depends on the choice of cross-border expansion mode. This study examines exclusive transactions as a key approach to cross-border expansion, analyzing their mechanisms and consequences through multi-case validation. Research reveals that exclusive transactions facilitate cross-business synergy via user lock-in and migration effects, enabling cross-market transmission of market power. To assess the impacts of exclusive transactions, it is crucial to evaluate both positive and negative effects across static and dynamic dimensions, then comprehensively determine their influence on market competition and consumer welfare. While single-business platforms primarily affect specific markets, ecosystem platforms demonstrate broader market influence. The platform can significantly enhance its market competition advantage through the cross-border transmission of market power under exclusive transactions. However, if the platform relies on this and does not continue to innovate to improve the quality of products (services), it will distort the market competition and eventually make exclusive transactions into a means of cross-border monopoly of the platform. Notably, ecosystem platforms are more prone to cross-border monopolization due to their extensive impact scope and stronger transmitted market power.
Keywords: Platform Economy Exclusive Dealing Platform Cross Border Cross-border monopoly Ecosystem
JEL Classification: L13 L41