欧盟反垄断中的同等效率竞争者(AEC)分析
文志成 秦建友 Sadam Hussain
摘 要:同等效率竞争者(as efficient competitor,简称AEC)原则及测试被欧盟反垄断机构用于对排他性滥用行为的效果进行量化分析,以界定此类滥用行为的市场封锁和反竞争效应。2022年判决的欧盟委员会诉Intel有条件折扣案、高通排他性支付案以及谷歌非法限制案中,欧盟委员会所提供的AEC测试结果都受到了法院的质疑并被全部或部分否定,这表明各方对于AEC分析原则及测试方面的理解和应用仍存在很大差异,AEC的未来应用充满挑战,AEC原则和测试相关的理论基础和应用边界还有待深入分析和研究。为此,本文借助学术文献以及欧盟反垄断法规和判例,从AEC原则及测试相关概念的来源和AEC测试的经济学原理出发,根据AEC在欧盟反垄断方面的具体规定,选取涉及AEC测试的排他性定价、掠夺性定价、选择性降价、有条件折扣以及利润挤压等具体判例进行对比和分析,以便完善对AEC分析的全面认识,弥补国内相关研究的缺失,并为未来国内反垄断工作在排他性滥用行为方面的量化分析和精准计算提供参考。
关键词:欧盟反垄断 排他性滥用行为 同等效率竞争者(AEC)原则 同等效率竞争者(AEC)测试
As-Efficient Competitor (AEC) Analysis in EU Antitrust
Zhicheng Wen Jianyou Qin Sadam Hussain
Abstract:EU antitrust authorities conduct a quantitative analysis of exclusive abuse based on the principle of as efficient competitor (AEC) and the use of AEC tests in order to define the foreclosure and anti-competitive nature of abusive behavior. The AEC test results adopted by the European Commission in the case of European Commission v. Intel Conditional Rebate, the case of Qualcomm Exclusive Payment and the case of Google Illegal restriction ended in 2022 were all challenged and overturned by the court, which indicates that there are still big differences in the understanding and application of principles and tests related to AEC analysis. The application status and future development of AEC are full of challenges, and the theoretical basis and application boundary of AEC principle and test are still to be deeply analyzed and studied. Therefore, with the help of academic literature and EU antitrust regulations and real anti-trust case judgments, this paper describes the sources of AEC principles and AEC test-related concepts as well as the economic principles of AEC testing. In order to achieve a comprehensive understanding of AEC analysis and make up for the lack of relevant research in China, this paper further compares and analyzes the specific provisions of AEC analysis in EU antitrust and the specific precedents on the abuse of exclusive pricing, predatory pricing, selective pricing, conditional rebate and profit squeezing. It also provides reference for the quantitative analysis and precise calculation of exclusive abuse in the future domestic anti-monopoly work.
Keywords: European Union antitrust; exclusionary abuse; as efficient competitor (AEC) principle; AEC test
JEL Classification: L40 K21
平台互联互通的实践反思与优化路径——以封禁行为为切入点
兰 江
摘 要:平台通过封禁行为排除竞争对手、构筑“围墙花园”对公平竞争秩序造成冲击,作为应对之策,监管部门通过多种方式推进平台互联互通,试图打破割据局面、促进平台竞争。然而,并非所有情况下平台封禁行为都会损害竞争,全面赋予平台互联互通义务也不一定能够提升消费者福利,反而可能带来损害创新和隐私安全的负面效果。为避免过度互联互通带来的风险,现阶段宜通过个案式的反垄断救济促进互联互通,而非“一刀切”式的事前监管。在具体实施方面,赋予平台互联互通义务应当以存在损害竞争的封禁行为为前提,并根据案件情况合理设计互联互通方案、限定适用范围。还应定期对互联互通救济措施展开事后评估,从而根据市场竞争格局变化及时做出适应性调整。
关键词:平台封禁 互联互通 事前监管 反垄断救济
Practical Reflection and Optimization Path of Platform Interoperability
——Taking Blocking Behavior as the Breakthrough Point
Jianghua Lan
Abstract: The Internet platform has created a “wall garden” through blocking behavior, eliminating competitors and harming the fair competition order. As a strategy of response, the regulatory authorities promote the interoperability of the platform through various ways, trying to break the separation situation and improve the degree of competition. However, the platform blocking behavior will not necessarily harm the competition, and comprehensively giving the platform interoperability obligations may not be able to promote consumer benefits, but may damage innovation and privacy security. In order to avoid the risks caused by excessive interoperability, it is advisable to promote interoperability through case-based antitrust enforcement at this stage, rather than “one size fits all” pre-supervision. In terms of specific application, the premise of requiring the platform to provide interoperability services is that the platform carries out behaviors that harm competition. The design and application scope of interoperability obligation should be determined according to the situation of the case. Regulators should periodically assess relief measures so as to make timely and adaptive adjustments according to changes in the market competition pattern.
Keywords: Platform Blocking Behavior Interoperability Pre-Supervision The Antitrust Remedy
JEL Classification: K21 L40
网上市场信息不对称治理机制的研究进展
李鹏升 陈艳莹
摘 要:网上市场的信息不对称程度天然高于线下市场,由此造成的逆向选择和道德风险问题已成为制约网上市场健康发展的顽症。本文从自我披露机制、卖家声誉机制、消费者保障机制、慈善机制和认证机制五个方面系统梳理了国内外学者对现有网上市场治理机制的研究成果,进而指出从理论层面探究现有市场治理机制的改进措施、各类治理机制的市场供给侧效应,以及如何利用大数据、人工智能技术实现治理手段的创新是未来解决网上市场信息不对称问题需要重点关注的方向。
关键词:网上市场 信息不对称 治理机制
Research Progress on Governance Mechanism of Information Asymmetry in Online Market
Pengsheng Li Yanying Chen
Abstract: The degree of information asymmetry in the online market is naturally higher than that in the offline market, and the resulting adverse selection and moral hazard problems have become a stubborn problem that restricts the healthy development of the online market. This paper systematically sorts out the research results of domestic and foreign scholars on the existing online market governance mechanism from five aspects: self-disclosure mechanism, seller reputation mechanism, consumer protection mechanism, charity mechanism and certification mechanism. It is pointed out that exploring the improvement measures of the existing market governance mechanism from the theoretical level, the market supply-side effect of various governance mechanisms, and how to use big data and artificial intelligence technology to realize the innovation of governance methods are the key directions to solve the problem of online market information asymmetry in the future.
Keywords: Online Market Information Asymmetry Governance Mechanism
JEL Classification: D12 L15 L81
纵向市场结构与优质内容的独家授权
——以在线音乐平台为例
李凯 刘智恒 温艳茹
摘 要:针对在线音乐平台中优质内容独家授权引发的竞争问题。本文构建了由一个优质内容供应商和两个横向差异化平台构成的纵向博弈模型,研究纵向分离和纵向一体化优质内容供应商独家授权的机理和效应。结果表明:优质内容供应商独家授权与否取决于平台差异化程度和交叉网络外部性强度;一体化内容供应商更倾向于将内容非独家授权给所有平台,独立内容供应商更倾向于进行高质量投资;不论纵向市场结构如何,内容供应商独家授权时的质量创新投资都大于非独家授权的情况,独家授权并不总会导致消费者剩余和社会福利降低。本文启示是:相关反垄断和规制工作中需要考虑在线音乐平台的纵向市场结构和内容供应商的质量创新投资,从而避免过度干预。
关键词:纵向市场结构 独占交易 平台竞争 反垄断
Vertical Market Structure and Exclusive Licensing of Premium Content
——Taking Online Music Platforms as An Example
Kai Li Zhiheng Liu Yanru Wen
Abstract: To address the competition problem arising from exclusive licensing of premium content in online music platforms. This paper constructs a vertical game model consisting of a premium content provider and two horizontally differentiated platforms to investigate the mechanism and effects of exclusive licensing by vertically separated and vertically integrated premium content providers. The results show that the exclusive licensing of premium content providers depends on the degree of platform differentiation and the strength of cross-network externalities. Integrated content providers are more likely to license content non-exclusively to all platforms, and independent content providers are more likely to make high-quality investments. Regardless of the vertical market structure, investment in quality innovation is greater when content providers license exclusively than when they license non-exclusively. Exclusive licensing does not always lead to lower consumer surplus and social welfare. The implication of this paper is that the vertical market structure of online music platforms and the investment in quality innovation by content providers need to be taken into account in relevant antitrust and regulatory efforts in order to avoid excessive intervention.
Keywords:Vertical Market Structure Exclusive Dealing Platform Competition Antitrust
JEL Classification:L13 L22 L42
元组织视角下分享经济组织的模式与治理研究
崔倩 李春利 高良谋
摘 要:分享经济组织作为一种优化资源配置、高效社会治理的新型组织模式,为刺激消费和经济高质量发展创造了新动能和新引擎。本文基于元组织视角提出分享经济组织是一种基于数字算法进行分工协作的元组织,且具有资源所有权与使用权分离、数字算法协调、产消一体化、数字社群属性等新特征。依据“控制-竞争”判别框架,将其分为强控制-高竞争、强控制-低竞争、弱控制-高竞争、弱控制-低竞争四种类型。其生成是数字技术革命背景下数字技术与制度要素的耦合驱动。通过构建“关系-控制-激励”三维治理框架能够解决分享经济组织的治理困境。本文立足元组织视角的研究有助于加深对分享经济组织性质的认识和理解。
关键词:分享经济 分享经济组织 数字算法 元组织 治理机制
Research on the Model and Governance of Sharing Economy Organizations from the Perspective of Meta-Organization
Qian Cui Chunli Li Liangmou Gao
Abstract: Driving the development of digital economy, sharing economy organization has been thought as a new organization model since the 21st century, but the related theoretical researches lag relatively behind. From the perspective of meta-organization, this paper puts forward that sharing economy organization is a meta-organization based on digital algorithm, and has new characteristics such as separation rights of resource’s owning and using, coordination of digital algorithm, integration of production and consumption, and attributes of digital community. According to the framework of "control-competition", sharing economy organizations can be divided into four types: Strong control - high competition, strong control - low competition, weak control - high competition, weak control - low competition. The reason for the formation of sharing economy organization is the driving force of digital technology and institutional elements under the background of digital technology revolution. Further analysis shows that the collective action dilemma can be solved by the "relation-control-incentive" three-dimensional governance framework. Based on the meta-organization perspective, this paper will be conductive to deepen the understanding of the nature of sharing economy organization.
Keywords: Sharing economy; Sharing economy Organization; Digital algorithm; Meta-organizations; Governance mechanism
JEL Classification:F270
积极评论回复对共享住宿产品消费者购买决策的影响研究
王博 贾婷
摘 要:消费者在购买共享住宿这类新型消费产品时会面临较强的信息不对称性。卖家回复作为卖家信号有助于降低信息不对称性,调解购买决策。然而,现有研究对于共享住宿背景下房东回复积极评论时形成的异质性卖家信号及其对购买决策的影响分析不足。基于此,本研究以信号理论为基础,从回复数量、回复内容以及回复差异三方面入手,将房东在回复积极评论时形成的卖家信号细分为总量信息、信息信号以及波动信号,并探究上述三类卖家信号对消费者购买决策的影响机制。通过爬取“小猪”中的1877家房源数据展开实证分析,结果显示:总量信号、信息信号和波动信号均有助于消费者购买决策发生,并且总量信号的刺激作用最强。此外,当房源的出租类型为非整套出租或者产品预定价格较低时,上述三类信号更有助于刺激消费者购买。因此,共享住宿房东可以通过增多回复数量、增加回复长度以及增强回复差异的方式促进消费者购买决策发生。其中,选择非整套出租或低价销售的房东可以更多的获得这三类回复策略带来的积极作用。
关键词:共享住宿平台 卖家回复 购买决策 信号理论
Research on the Impact of Positive Review Responses on Consumer Purchase Decisions of Sharing Accommodation Products
——Analysis Based on Signal Theory
Bo Wang Ting Jia
Abstract:Consumers will face strong information asymmetry when purchasing new consumer products, such as sharing accommodation. The seller response as a seller signal helps to reduce information asymmetry and mediate purchase decisions. However, existing research lacks analysis on the heterogeneity signals formed by hosts' different response strategies to positive reviews in the context of sharing accommodation and their impact on purchase decisions. To this end, this subdivides the seller signals formed by hosts in response to positive reviews from three aspects (response quantity, response content, and response difference) into three types based on signal theory, specifically including total signals, informational signals, and fluctuating signals and explores the mechanism of these three types of seller signals on consumer purchase decisions. An empirical analysis was conducted by crawling data from 1877 listings on the Xiaozhu platform, and the results showed that the total signal, informational signal, and fluctuating signal all contribute to consumer purchasing decisions. Among them, the total signal has the strongest promoting effect. In addition, when the rental type of the property is no-entire sharing, or the product reservation price is low, the above three types of seller signals can stimulate consumers to purchase more. Therefore, sharing accommodation hosts can promote consumer purchase decisions by increasing response volumes, content, and differences. Among them, hosts who choose no-entire sharing or low-price sales can gain more positive effects..
Keywords:Sharing Accommodation Platform Seller Response Purchase Decision Signal Theory
JEL Classification:M31 Z33
用工短缺、劳动力市场发育与制造企业技术创新
匡慧姝 刘政 杨先明
摘 要:借助短缺用工的市场推力,技术能够跃升;但因劳动力市场发育不足,技术换人的禀赋力量可能受阻,用工短缺难以顺畅地推动企业技术创新。立足权威机构调查,将高管感知的劳动人员缺乏,作为企业用工短缺的代理指标,检验了用工短缺影响制造企业创新的自发条件与作用机制。研究发现,用工短缺显著提升了制造企业研发强度,说明我国存在着制造业缺人到技术涌现的自发转向过程;选取历史降雨量作为工具变量,重新随机赋值用工短缺感知程度,采用用工空缺率缓解测度偏误,以及重构面板数据控制遗漏变量等,均证实该结论稳健显著。就机理而言,用工短缺通过职业转换成本的价格效应和中间品交易效率的市场规模效应分别推动技术换人,但价格效应更强;劳动力市场扭曲和劳动力市场摩擦对企业技术创新产生了“刀锋效应”:前者甚至完全抵消价格效应,引致技术换人的进程逆转;后者反而过度增强价格效应,导致过早过多的技术换人。文章为建设全国统一的劳动力大市场和打通用工短缺自发推动技术创新的堵塞通道提供启示。
关键词:用工短缺 技术创新 劳动力市场发育 刀锋效应
Labor Shortage, Labor Market Development and Technological Innovation of Manufacturing Enterprises
Huishu Kuang Zheng Liu Xianming Yang
Abstract: With the market push of labor shortage, technology can jump.However, due to the insufficient development of the labor market, the endowment power of technology replacement may be hindered, and the shortage of labor force is difficult to smoothly promote the technological innovation of enterprises. Based on the investigation of authoritative institutions, the lack of labor perceived by senior executives is taken as the proxy indicator of the employment shortage of enterprises, and the spontaneous conditions and mechanism of the impact of employment shortage on enterprise innovation are tested. The study found that the labor shortage significantly enhanced the R&D intensity of manufacturing enterprises, indicating that there is a spontaneous turning process from the lack of personnel to the emergence of technology in China's manufacturing industry; The historical rainfall was selected as the tool variable, the labor shortage degree was randomly assigned, the labor vacancy rate was used to mitigate the measurement error, and the panel data was reconstructed to control the missing variable, all of which confirmed that the conclusion was robust and significant. As far as the mechanism is concerned, the labor shortage promotes the technology turnover through the price effect of occupation switching cost and the market scale effect of intermediate goods trading efficiency, respectively, but the price effect is stronger; Labor market distortion and labor market friction have a "knife edge effect" on enterprise technological innovation: the former even completely offset the price effect, leading to the reversal of the process of technology replacement; On the contrary, the latter overemphasizes the price effect, leading to too many premature technology replacements. The article provides inspiration for building a national unified labor market and the blocking channel of technological innovation spontaneously driven by the shortage of general workers。
Keywords: Labor Shortage Technological Innovation Labor Market Development Knife Edge Effect
JEL Classification: D24 J82 L10