产业安全水平测评方法研究
—系统性评述与规范性重构
马文军
摘 要:当前产业安全水平测评的指标体系方法和DEA方法均存在问题,难以形成共识和规范,映射出学术界在产业安全基本概念和基本逻辑方面认识不够清晰科学。梳理产业安全思想发展演变的基本脉络,总体呈现出一种“中心-外围”、“开放-保护”和“竞争力-控制力”的基本范式。产业竞争力和产业控制力是产业安全研究的两大基本内容取向,有关产业安全水平测评方法的规范性构建,应该从这两个基本视角进行。其中,基于产业竞争力的产业安全水平测评,应该基于Malmquist指数法,从生产效率及其相对比较的竞争力优势角度进行;基于控制力的产业安全水平测评,应该运用定性判别方法,从产业控制力门限的角度进行。
关键词:产业竞争力 产业控制力 安全测评 Malmquist指数法 定性判别法
Study on the Evaluation Methods of Industry Security Level:
A Systematic Review and Normative Reconstruction
Wenjun Ma
Abstract:There are some problems both existing in index system method and DEA method for evaluation of industry security level which resulting in difficulty to form a consensus and specification and mapping out its unclear and unscientific in understanding the basic concept and logic of industry security in academic circle. Research shows that it has generally brought a basic paradigm with characteristics of "core-periphery", "opening-protection" and "Competitive power-control force" in the evolution process of industrial security outlook. As industrial competitive power and industrial control force are the two basic elements of industrial security paradigm, it should to construct evaluation methods of industry security normatively from the two basic perspectives. Among them, the evaluation method of industry security based on industry competitive power should be constructed from the perspective of production efficiency and the relative competitive advantage by the Malmquist index method, and the evaluation method of industry security based on industry control force should be constructed from the perspective of control threshold of foreign capital in domestic industries by the method of qualitative identification.
Keywords:Industrial Competitive Power Industrial Control Force Security Evaluation Malmquist Index Method Qualitative Method
JEL Classification: L00 B41 C51
环境规制对中国能源产业清洁生产的激励机制:一个两阶段博弈分析
任旭东
摘 要:根据环境规制对中国能源产业清洁生产激励机制的两阶段博弈分析,环境规制对中国能源产业清洁生产的激励相容存在强、弱充分条件之分;政府当期正式环境规制的财政和金融政策、同期非正式环境规制与能源企业自身同期环保要素高效投入的有机结合是其强充分条件;政府当期正式环境规制排污收费标准(环境保护税税率)的有效机制设计是其弱充分条件。两者均内生地包括环境规制对中国能源产业清洁生产的正向激励机制和负向激励机制;能源企业当期仅达标排污行为会自发地引致相应的正向激励机制,而能源企业同期超标排污行为则会自发地引致相应的负向激励机制。当两个充分条件中有一个充分条件满足时,环境规制对中国能源产业清洁生产的激励机制兼备惩罚约束与激励相容,代表性能源企业当期实施完全遵守正式环境规制策略是其稳定的占优策略,故其会全力践行其能源产品的清洁生产,从而实现其个人理性与集体理性的有机统一。而在强、弱充分条件均失效时,政府客观准确地量化环境自身质量的当期估值和因良好环境质量而引致的当期正外部收益,且有效削减其同期正式环境规制的监管成本,将予以其同期执行严格正式环境规制策略的正向激励,进而倒逼代表性能源企业同期实施完全遵守正式环境规制策略。
关键词:能源产业 环境规制 清洁生产
The Incentive Mechanism for Environmental Regulation on Cleaner Production of China’s Energy Industry:A Two-Stage Game Analysis
Xudong Ren
Abstract: The two-stage game analysis of incentive mechanism for environmental regulation on cleaner production of China’s energy industry stated that the incentive compatibility for environmental regulation on cleaner production of China’s energy industry existed stronger sufficient condition and weaker sufficient condition. The stronger sufficient condition included fiscal policies and financial policies of formal environmental regulation, informal environmental regulation and energy firms’ efficient labor, capital and technology inputs for environment protecting in the current period. The weaker sufficient condition was current effective mechanism design of pollution charge schedules or environmental protection tax rates of formal environmental regulation. Both sufficient conditions endogenously contained positive incentive mechanism and negative incentive mechanism for environmental regulation on cleaner production of China’s energy industry. Energy firms’ current pure standard pollution discharged behaviors would spontaneously induce to positive incentive mechanism, yet energy firms’ current substandard pollution discharged behaviors would spontaneously lead to negative incentive mechanism. When one of the two sufficient conditions was satisfied, the incentive mechanism for environmental regulation on cleaner production of China’s energy industry contained participation constraint and incentive compatibility, and representative energy firm’s current fixed dominant strategy was completely obeying the formal environmental regulation, thus it would fully realize the cleaner production in its energy products and attain the organic unity of individual rationality and collective rationality. However, when stronger sufficient condition and weaker sufficient condition were both failed, if government could objectively and accurately quantify the values and positive externality revenues of environment, cut down its formal environmental regulated costs in the current period, then government currently would still have positive incentive for practicing strict formal environmental regulation which could force representative energy firm to choose the strategy of completely obeying formal environmental regulation at the same period.
Keywords: Energy Industry Environmental Regulation Clean Production
JEL Classification: C72 L51 Q58
中国专利法侵权赔偿顺位规则:基于经济学视角
王建华 马双燕
摘 要:中国专利法侵权赔偿顺位规则在法学界存在较大的争议。本文立足于经济原理,研究分析两种不同的责任规则对创新活动及国家福利的影响。研究结果表明:“不当得利”规则下的国家总福利总是小于或者等于“损失利润”规则下的水平,即“损失利润”规则的应用符合国家福利最大化利益原则。此外,除非国家知识产权保护水平很强,否则“损失利润”规则进行侵权赔偿也是符合专利权人利益的最优选项。这些结论说明中国专利法对侵权赔偿顺位规则的相关条款具有经济上的合理性。
关键词:专利法 顺位规则 不当得利 损失利润 国家福利
Infringement Compensation Priority Rules of China’s Patent Law :An Economic perspective
Jianhua Wang Shuangyan Ma
Abstract:Debates have continued about infringement compensation priority rules of china’s patent law in the scope of law science. Based on the economic perspectives, this paper discusses the impact of two different liability rules on innovation activities and national welfare. The results show that the national welfare under the rules of unjust enrichment is always less than or equal to the lost profit. In other words, lost profit rule is consistent with national welfare standard. Unless the intellectual property protection is very strong, otherwise the optimum choice to patent holder is lost profit. Those conclusions show that the relevant provisions of China’s patent law to infringement compensation priority rules are economically reasonable.
Keywords: Patent Law Priority Rules Unjust Enrichment Lost Profit National Welfare
JEL Classification: O30 L10 D80 K40
产能约束、管输约束和天然气管网的第三方准入
——基于MCP模型的分析
徐婧
摘 要:本文使用MCP模型模拟了天然气市场中存在产能约束、管输约束情况下多方市场主体的收益变化和拥堵租补贴分配方案,得到管网第三方准入自主实现的条件,对我国天然气市场化改革提出了政策建议。模拟结论显示,一体化企业意愿开放管网,同时被准入企业意愿使用管网只出现在两类情况下:一是高管输约束和低产能约束的搭配,此时体现拥堵租的管输费用收益应该补贴给一体化企业。二是高产能约束与低管输约束的搭配,此时应该同时补贴被准入的企业和一体化企业。
关键词:产能约束 管输约束 第三方准入
Production Congestion, Transportation Congestion and Third Party Access to Natural Gas Pipeline Network: Simulation Analysis Based on MCP Model
Jing Xu
Abstract:This paper applies a third party access model based on multiple complementarity problem (MCP) for gas pipeline network where an independent system operator leads to flow optimization and transfers the congestion rent to former integrated gas company to compensate its actual loss control of pipeline operation. Different production and transportation congestion conditions are tested for its feasibility with Pareto improvement. The result shows feasible third party access model only happens where low (high) production congestion condition combined with high (low) transmission congestion condition. Under the former situation, congestion rent should be compensated to the integrated gas company while under the latter, both integrated gas company and access company should be compensated.
Keywords:Production Capacity Constraint Transmission Capacity Constraint Third Party Access
JEL Classification: L13 P28 C63
进入成本强度与寡头三级价格歧视的进入阻止效应
唐要家 吕萃
摘 要:寡头三级价格歧视是否会成为支配企业排斥市场进入的策略工具是价格歧视理论尚未解决的问题,并影响了反垄断执法审查。本文采用具有固定进入成本和不对称竞争的在位者-进入者模型并考虑政府政策干预影响来分析寡头三级价格歧视的进入阻止效应,结果显示:只有在进入成本中等的情况下,三级价格歧视才会产生伤害社会福利排他效应,在进入成本较低和较高的情况下,三级价格歧视通常提高社会总福利。在进入需要支付固定成本的情况下,进入者的进入竞争并不一定与福利提高相一致,政府禁止价格歧视尽管可能会有利于进入,但往往会恶化社会福利。因此,政府应谨慎禁止寡头企业三级价格歧视行为,只有在进入成本中等且价格歧视导致“同等有效率竞争者”被封锁时才应介入。对市场封锁性三级价格歧视的反垄断审查应该充分考虑市场进入固定成本的高低、强市场与弱市场的相对规模、市场容量、产品替代性程度等因素。
关键词:寡头市场 三级价格歧视 进入阻止 反垄断
Third-degree Price Discrimination under Oligopoly Market
Yaojia Tang Cui Lv
Abstract: It is still not clear whether third-degree price discrimination in oligopoly will become the strategic tool of entry deterrence. Based on fixed entry costs and asymmetric competition incumbents-entrants model and considering the impact of government policy, we analysis the entry deterrence effect of third-degree price discrimination in oligopoly. The result shows that third-degree price discrimination indeed become a strategic tool which can prevent the entry of competitors under some condition. Exclusive third-degree price discrimination should be prohibit by antitrust laws. Antitrust test of exclusive price discrimination properly should take full account of the level of fixed costs of market entry, the relative size between strong sub-market and weak sub-markets, as well as the degree of product substitution.
Keywords: Oligopoly Market Third-degree Price Discrimination Entry Deterrence Antitrust
JEL Classification: O17 R58 H11
非正规就业、劳动力流动与货币政策
陈利锋
摘 要:本文建立了一个包含非正规就业的多部门NK-DSGE模型,并基于这一模型对我国劳动力市场动态与非正规就业广泛存在背景下的货币政策机制进行了分析。我们首先利用我国的现实数据对这一模型进行了贝叶斯估计,在此基础上对单一部门模型与多部门模型进行了比较。模型选择检验的结果发现,现实数据显著支持了多部门模型。外生冲击的贝叶斯脉冲响应函数显示,不同部门的就业、新雇佣数量以及产出等变量对于同一外生冲击具有不同的动态反应,这一发现意味着考虑不同部门之间异质性的多部门模型可能更为合理。敏感度分析的结果指出,家庭成员风险共担的程度对于主要宏观经济变量的波动性与持续性均具有显著影响。货币政策分析的结果表明,对失业做出反应的Evans规则具有最小的社会福利损失,这意味着在当前我国就业形势日益严峻的背景下,采用这一政策机制对于缓解失业以及降低政策引起的社会福利损失等均具有相对较好的政策效果。另外,对正规部门雇佣成本做出反应的政策机制所引起的社会福利损失也相对较小,因而在政府积极推进机关事业单位养老机制改革的过程中,采用这一政策机制作为辅助,对于我国劳动力市场状况的改善也将具有积极的意义。
关键词:非正规就业 非正规部门 新凯恩斯主义 劳动力市场 货币政策
Informal Employment, Labor Mobility and Monetary Policy
Lifeng Chen
Abstract:This paper considers a multi-sector new Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with informal employment, and investigates labor market dynamics and monetary policy when informal employment is significantly exist. We estimate the multi-sector model with Bayesian methods, and compare this model with one- sector model. The result of model comparison tells that, multi-sector model was supported overwhelmingly by the data. The impulse response function shows that, employment, new hires and output of different sector response differently when the same shocks hit the economy. It means that the multi-sector model may be reasonable. The result of sensitivity analysis argues that, perfect risk sharing will affect the volatilities and durations of model variables. Further, the result of monetary analysis believes that, the social welfare loss caused by Evans rule that react to unemployment is the least one, it means that when the condition of labor market become seriously, the monetary authority may use this rule to alleviate unemployment , and, the social welfare loss may quantitative smallest. And, the policy reacts to the hiring cost of formal employment may helpful for the improvement of labor market, especially when the government promotes the reform of social security system in formal sector.
Keywords:Informal Employment Informal Sector New Keynesian Labor Market Monetary Policy
JEL Classification: E24 E32 E52
地方政府角色,政企行为逻辑和最低质量标准规制的
社会福利效应
浦徐进 何未敏
摘 要:本文分别在地方政府是中央政府代理人、理性经济人和寻租型经营者三种角色下,通过构建“中央政府——地方政府——企业——消费者”的理论分析框架,剖析地方政府和企业的行为逻辑影响最低质量标准规制政策实施效果的机理。研究结果发现:相比于地方政府是中央政府代理人的情形,当地方政府是理性经济人时,企业效用水平和地方政府效用水平将会增加,而企业遵从程度、消费者效用水平和社会福利水平将会降低;而当地方政府是寻租型经营者时,企业效用水平和地方政府效用水平达到最高,企业遵从程度、消费者效用水平和社会福利水平却变为最低。因此,只有深入理解地方政府和企业的行为逻辑,才能更好地预测和评价最低质量标准规制的现实遵从程度和社会福利效应。
关键词:地方政府角色 最低质量标准规制 行为逻辑社会福利水平
Local Government Types , Government and Enterprise’s Behavior Logic and The Social Welfare Effect of Minimum Quality Standards Regulation
Xujin Pu Weimin He
Abstract: We construct an analysis framework consisting of the central government, a local government, a representative firm, and consumers. This study analyzes how the local government’s enforcement, the firm’s compliance, and their interaction influence the effectiveness of regulation after the central government has established Minimum Quality Standards policies. We construct three scenarios: perfect enforcement, imperfect enforcement, and collusion. We show that when the local government enforces the regulation imperfectly, the firm’s utility and the local government’s utility are higher, while the degree of the firm’s compliance, consumers’ utility and the level of social welfare are lower. In the case in which there is collusion between the local government and the firm, the firm’s utility and the local government’s utility are the highest, and the degree of the firm’s compliance, consumers’ utility, and the level of social welfare are the lowest among the three scenarios. This study proves that the behavior of governments and firms play a vital role in the effectiveness of Minimum Quality Standards regulations.
Keywords: Local Government Types Minimum Quality Standards Regulation Behavior Logic Social Welfare
JEL Classification: D21 L12 L15
通道费理论的研究脉络及进展
——基于“效率促进派”与“市场势力派”的研究综述
李凯 刘馨阳
摘 要:针对当前通道费的理论研究,在明晰通道费问题缘起的基础上,将近几十年来具有代表性的研究成果根据“效率促进派”和“市场势力派”两大主流学派进行分类,并在每类别之下,根据不同研究所关注的重点问题进一步整理并评述。最后,在对已有文献总结凝练基础之上,提出了未来通道费理论研究应该遵循的一种新视角。与传统观点有所不同,笔者认为,通道费本身就具有效率促进与竞争抑制的双重效应,而两种并存的效应中哪一种效应占据主导地位与市场环境紧密相关。因此,笔者提出应该基于效率促进与抑制并存的新视角对通道费的相关理论进行拓展研究。本文厘清了通道费理论的研究脉络与进展,较全面呈现了研究领域内既有理论探索及实证研究成果,提出了通道费问题理论研究的新视角。
关键词:通道费理论 效率促进派 市场势力派 市场环境
Slotting Allowances, their History and Development——a Survey based on Schools of “Efficiency Improvement” and “Exercise of Market Power”
Kai Li Xinyang Liu
Abstract:This paper addresses slotting allowance theory, clarifying its genesis and categorizing recent research. All typical theories concerning slotting allowances can be divided into two schools of thought, “Efficiency Improvement” and “Exercise of Market Power”. This paper puts forwards a new perspective, namely an understanding of slotting allowances using both of these countervailing effects. These two effects, Efficiency Improvement and Exercise of Market Power, coexist. Which one is dominant depends on several comprehensive factors influencing a given market. We provide a new perspective for future research. We examine the sequence and evolution of the theory of slotting allowances so as to generalize the existing work which has been based on both qualitative and quantitative methods. In addition, the new perspective raised by this study will shed new light on the deeper and wider exploration of related theories.
Keywords:Slotting Allowances Efficiency Improvement Exercise of Market Power Market Characters
JEL Classification: L11 L42 L81
批发组织演化的国外研究进展
谢莉娟 李晓雪
摘 要:批发组织的演化一直是应用经济学领域以及产业组织演化中富有争议的研究议题。信息、物流技术的进步和电子商务的蓬勃发展的背景下,批发组织的去中间化与再中间化问题备受关注。本文对批发组织的研究成果进行梳理,重点锁定有关批发商的专门文献,同时还在部分关于中间商的经典研究中探寻批发组织的演化线索。研究发现,即便有关批发商将会消亡的论调在理论界时常兴起,但现实观察与实证分析均证明,批发组织仍然在现代流通体系中扮演着重要角色。传统批发组织具有规模经济、范围经济和专业化优势,而供应链管理背景下,则在继承传统优势的基础上演化出一系列新兴的专业优势,同时在国际贸易领域也发挥着引人注目的作用。本文的文献梳理有助于揭开批发组织演化的“迷纱”,并为现代批发组织的角色转型及其未来发展提供启发。
关键词:批发组织 生存依据 渠道变革 动态演化
Overseas Study on Revolution of Wholesaling Organization
Lijuan Xie Xiaoxue Li
Abstract:The revolution of wholesaling organization has been a controversial research topic in the field of applied economics. As information and logistic technology progressing and flourishing, “disintermediation” and “reintermediation” of wholesaling organization has become an issue of concern. This paper reviews the former research achievement of the wholesaling organization, focuses on the specific literature on the wholesalers, and meanwhile explores the revolutionary clue of wholesaling organization based on the classic study of the intermediate business. The result of research shows that despite of the prevalent prospective of the wholesaler’s demise in the theoretic field, what appears to be occurring is that wholesaler organization plays an important role in the modern distribution channel, which is supported by reality and empirical analysis. While conventional wholesalers have advantages of economies of scale, economies of scope and specialization, under the background of supply chain management business context, the wholesalers have developed a series of new specialization advantages on the basis of inheriting the conventional advantages, and play a distinguish role in the international trade area. Literature review in this paper will help to reveal the revolution of wholesaling organization, and provides inspiration for the role transition and the future development of the modern wholesaling organization.
Key words: Wholesaling Organization Existence Basis Channel Change Dynamic Revolution
JEL Classification: F02 L81 O14