关键词： 战略性新兴产业 研发补贴 产品补贴 定位策略
R&D versus output subsidies in the competition of strategic and emerging industries
Xingzhi Xiao Yipan Wang
Abstract:Given the complexity of the technology, uncertainty, the high of spillover effects and the insufficient of market demand in Strategic emerging industries, without government intervention, the enterprises can’t develop and grow successfully in their own right. Government may encourage enterprises' innovation by way of R&D subsidy. Government gives more subsidies to strategic and emerging industries designed to promote innovation. The main two ways for subsidies are business-oriented R&D subsidies and product-oriented price subsidies. This paper based on the vertically differential Hotelling Model, through the establishment of a three-stage game model, analyses the impact of different way of subsidies on R&D competition. We find that R&D subsidies do not affect market shares in competition between enterprises, but will promote the enterprises to increase R&D investment; output subsidies affect the market share of the enterprise, and the role to promote cutting-edge technology was not important, but it can improve the technological level of traditional industries. What's more, the higher the output subsidy rate is good for lower quality companies to expand market share. Therefore, the government subsidy policy should be considered two different effects.
Keywords:Strategic & Emerging Industries R&D Subsidies Output Subsidies the Positioning Strategy
JEL Classification: L53 L60 O25
付才辉 林民书 赖小琼
关键词：产业升级 民工进城 城乡收入差距
Industrial Upgrading，Rural Migrant Workers and Income Gap between Urban and Rural
Caihui Fu Minshu Lin Xiaoqiong Lai
Abstract: It is a key to understand the theory paradox in classic economic literatures on the rural migrant and the income gap between urban and rural residents in China that to consider the change of industrial upgrading. This paper proposes a new premise that the influence of rural migrant workers on income of urban and rural residents depends on industrial upgrading. It is the logic of the premise, which income level of and gap between urban and rural residents are sealed by the relationships of substitution and complementary and the wage difference of occupation between rural migration workers and urban residents under the background of the dual economic, which depend on the division of labor and the job skills that also depend on industrial level. The income gap would become narrower without continuation, if industrial level is lower; it would become wider more and more, if higher. In fact, this conclusion highlights the intensive contradiction between development and distribution in the process of economic transition in china. The source of contradiction is that governments do not make the equalization of the human capital, but try their best to push forward industrial upgrading in the process of economic transition. As result, the income inequality is enlarged swiftly by the deteriorative human capital inequality through fast industrial upgrading. It is the only road of development strategy to pursue simultaneously the efficiency and equality that the industrial upgrading keeps pace with the human capital equalizing.
Keywords: Industrial Upgrading Rural Migration Worker Income Gap between Urban and Rural
JEL Classification: J61 O18 R11
关键词：沉淀资本 固定成本 进入壁垒 进入均衡 策略性行为
Sunk Capital, Fixed Cost and Entry Equilibrium
Abstract:Sunk capital contributes to entry barriers, and fixed cost determines the validity of entry barriers. This article discusses the comprehensive effects of sunk capital and fixed cost on the entry equilibrium in three different situations: no depreciation, little depreciation, and large depreciation of sunk capital, and concludes the specific conditions of entry equilibrium, which is divided into three kinds: natural monopoly, artificial monopoly and duopoly. The conclusion is made that the sunk capital can only affect the strategic behavior of the incumbent and has an impact on the entry equilibrium indirectly through fixed cost. It is not the fact that the fixed cost being larger the smaller probability entry is successful. The entry equilibrium depends on both of the sunk capital and the fixed cost. As a result, the theoretical basis of judging monopoly and the guidance of antitrust are supplied.
Keywords:Sunk Capital Fixed Cost Entry Barriers Entry Equilibrium Strategic Behavior
JEL Classification: L11 L12 L13
闫 威 党文珊 罗雨鹤
关键词：垂直一体化 拆台 社会福利
A Review on Sabotage Behavior of Vertical Integrated Provider
Wei Yan Wenshan Dang Yuhe Luo
Abstract：When upstream monopolist vertically integrates downstream, on the one hand, it can reap vertical economies and save costs; on the other hand, the vertically integrated provider (VIP) will have the incentive to delay the delivery or degrade the quality of access provided to independent rivals to damage the rivals’ competitiveness. Based on a series of literature, this article reviews the VIP’s sabotage activities. Firstly, we analyze the influences of price regulation and subsidiary’s scale and efficiency on upstream monopolist’s vertical integration choice. Secondly, we sum up the determinants of the VIP’s sabotage activity and discuss its social welfare effects. Some policy suggestions are also put forward in the last part based on the reality of enterprise competition.
Keywords:Vertical Integration Sabotage Social Welfare
JEL Classification: L13 L22
冯旭南 李心愉 陈工孟
摘 要：本文以558家地方政府控制的上市公司为样本，研究国企改革过程中，政治成本和代理成本对公司价值有何影响，以及能否减轻这种影响。我们发现，较高的政府终极控制权对公司价值产生负面影响，这不仅为Frye & Shleifer（1997）的“掠夺之手理论”提供了证据，而且初步打开了“国有股影响企业绩效”（Shlefer，1998）的“黑匣子”。我们还发现，通过监督公司高层甚至解聘经营不善的董事长或CEO能够缓解代理成本的消极影响。更重要的是，治理环境的改善能够同时降低政治成本和代理成本，有利于国企改革的顺利进行。
关键词： 政治成本 代理成本 国企改革
Political Control, Agency Cost and Firm Value
Xunan Feng Xinyu Li Gongmeng Cheng
Abstract：Using data from the 558 local government controlled listed-firms, we study the impact of political control and agency cost on corporate valuation and how to mitigate such negative impact. We find that reducing the ultimate control rights can lessen the political control and that monitoring and even firing the management can mitigate the agency cost. Most importantly, improving the institutional environment can improve the value through lessening the political cost and agency cost.
Keywords：Political Control Agency Cost SOE Reform
JEL Classification：C21 G38 L25
关键词：FDI 技术溢出 R&D 吸收能力
FDI Technology Spillover Effect: A Literature Review
Xiaojing Yang Guoliang Liu
Abstract：FDI Technology Spillover is an important channel of international technology transfer and diffusion, as well as an important way for an economy——especially for developing countries and regions to achieve technological progress. This paper firstly introduces the mechanisms and channels of FDI technology spillover, then concludes the controversy about FDI technology spillover effect in recent years and analyzes the cause of the controversy, and finally carries on the review over the existing research and makes an outlook for further study, in order to provide reference for developing countries and regions to achieve technology progress and economic growth by making full use of FDI technology spillover effect.
Keywords：FDI Technology Spillover R&D Absorptive Capacity
JEL classification：F21 F23 O33
杜曙光 刘 刚
关键词：三维企业边界 多元化经营 一体化 规模经济 范围经济
Three-Dimensional Enterprise Boundaries and Diversified Operation
──The Unity of Scale Economy, Scope Economy and Integration Strategy
Shuguang Du Gang Liu
Abstract: The most fundamental corporate decisions is to choose " what are produced, how much to produce ," that the corporate boundaries proposition. In terms of quantitative model, on the corner solution of " how much to produce " , also the optimal solution of "what are produced". The choice scope of enterprise production decision is not confined to one vertical industry chain inside, transverse stretching across different industry chain become the important content of enterprise boundary governance. Limited to the vertical industry chain to discuss the trade-off between enterprise and market, can not reveal all the meaning of enterprise boundary evolution. Meanwhile, the transaction cost is not the only factor in deciding the border, build the unity of the production cost and transaction cost analysis framework is inevitable trend in the development of the theory. On the basis of constructing the three-dimensional enterprise boundary model shows that in the traditional study, strategic level "vertical integration--horizontal integration" and " scale economy --scope economy" to form the "cost savings mechanism" on the logical point was " staggered complementary "relationships , likely to cause theory dislocation. These concepts into three-dimensional enterprise boundary model unified analysis framework, not only can clarify the dislocation of related theory , but also can be integrated the influence of productive resources and trade resources, system research enterprise in the specialized production and diversified complicated decision-making process, reveals many theoretical space that has yet to gain further study.
Keywords: Three-Dimensional Enterprise Boundarres Diversified Operation Integration Economy of Scale Economy of Scope
JEL Classification: L22 D21
胡德宝 林 娜
关键词：经济规制 福利损失 放松规制 寡头垄断
Measurement of Welfare Loss to China’s Petroleum Industry —Perspective of Deregulation
Debao Hu Na Lin
Abstract:From reform and opening-up, the marketization level of China’s petroleum industry increases gradually. But for the sake of excessive regulation, monopolistic conditions in the industry have not been improved, which causes plenty of welfare losses. There were lots of previous studies on welfare loss cost by monopoly. In which, Arrow and Krugman’s pioneering studies of measurement to the welfare loss cost by petroleum industry regulation is typical. Although it is specific in China’s petroleum industry induced by administrative monopoly, but these methods are still fit for China. This paper takes Cournot duopoly model to evaluate welfare loss caused by regulation in China’s petroleum industry. The empirical result shows that excessive regulation causes lots of dead-weighted welfare loss, which accounts for 6 to 7 percent of main business income. Therefore, it is time to reduce the welfare loss in Chinese petroleum industry now, and deregulation is needed to improve industry performance.
Keywords:Economic Regulation Welfare Loss Deregulation Oligopoly
JEL Classification: C23 D43 L60 M38