不同补贴方式对战略性新兴产业竞争格局的影响
肖兴志 王伊攀
摘 要：战略性新兴产业由于技术上的复杂性、不确定性、外溢性以及市场需求的拉动不足，完全依靠自身力量不足以发展壮大，政府对其进行了大力度的补贴。补贴方式主要有面向企业的研发补贴和面向产品的价格补贴。本文在纵向差异化Hotelling模型的基础上，通过建立三阶段的博弈模型，分别考察了研发补贴与产品补贴两种不同的补贴方式对于研发竞争格局的影响。结果表明，研发补贴不会影响竞争企业间的市场份额，但会促进企业增加研发投入；产品补贴对企业的市场份额有影响，对于尖端技术的促进作用不大，但可以提高传统产业的技术水平；产品补贴率越高，对质量定位较低的企业的拓展市场份额越有利。因此，政府在制定补贴政策时需考虑两者的不同影响。
关键词： 战略性新兴产业 研发补贴 产品补贴 定位策略
R&D versus output subsidies in the competition of strategic and emerging industries
Xingzhi Xiao Yipan Wang
Abstract:Given the complexity of the technology, uncertainty, the high of spillover effects and the insufficient of market demand in Strategic emerging industries, without government intervention, the enterprises can’t develop and grow successfully in their own right. Government may encourage enterprises' innovation by way of R&D subsidy. Government gives more subsidies to strategic and emerging industries designed to promote innovation. The main two ways for subsidies are business-oriented R&D subsidies and product-oriented price subsidies. This paper based on the vertically differential Hotelling Model, through the establishment of a three-stage game model, analyses the impact of different way of subsidies on R&D competition. We find that R&D subsidies do not affect market shares in competition between enterprises, but will promote the enterprises to increase R&D investment; output subsidies affect the market share of the enterprise, and the role to promote cutting-edge technology was not important, but it can improve the technological level of traditional industries. What's more, the higher the output subsidy rate is good for lower quality companies to expand market share. Therefore, the government subsidy policy should be considered two different effects.
Keywords:Strategic & Emerging Industries R&D Subsidies Output Subsidies the Positioning Strategy
JEL Classification: L53 L60 O25
产业升级、民工进城与城乡收入差距
付才辉 林民书 赖小琼
摘 要：考虑产业升级是解开中国城乡劳动力流动与城乡收入差距悖论的关键。产业级别的高低决定了分工链的长短宽窄以及岗位技能的异同，从而决定了进城民工与城市居民在劳动力市场上的替代补缺关系以及职业报酬差异，进而决定了二元经济背景下城乡居民绝对收入与相对差距。产业级别低时，民工进城使得城乡收入差距缩小，但不可持续；产业级别高时，民工进城使得城乡收入差距持续扩大。上述结论实际上凸显了中国经济结构变迁中发展方式与收入分配的矛盾：产业在持续升级的同时人力资本并未得到有效的均等化，人力资本不均等通过快速的产业升级迅猛地放大了收入不平等。中国要想在初次分配中就实现效率和平等的双赢，使得产业升级与人力资本均等化并驾齐驱是调整经济发展方式的政策必由之路。
关键词：产业升级 民工进城 城乡收入差距
Industrial Upgrading，Rural Migrant Workers and Income Gap between Urban and Rural
Caihui Fu Minshu Lin Xiaoqiong Lai
Abstract: It is a key to understand the theory paradox in classic economic literatures on the rural migrant and the income gap between urban and rural residents in China that to consider the change of industrial upgrading. This paper proposes a new premise that the influence of rural migrant workers on income of urban and rural residents depends on industrial upgrading. It is the logic of the premise, which income level of and gap between urban and rural residents are sealed by the relationships of substitution and complementary and the wage difference of occupation between rural migration workers and urban residents under the background of the dual economic, which depend on the division of labor and the job skills that also depend on industrial level. The income gap would become narrower without continuation, if industrial level is lower; it would become wider more and more, if higher. In fact, this conclusion highlights the intensive contradiction between development and distribution in the process of economic transition in china. The source of contradiction is that governments do not make the equalization of the human capital, but try their best to push forward industrial upgrading in the process of economic transition. As result, the income inequality is enlarged swiftly by the deteriorative human capital inequality through fast industrial upgrading. It is the only road of development strategy to pursue simultaneously the efficiency and equality that the industrial upgrading keeps pace with the human capital equalizing.
Keywords: Industrial Upgrading Rural Migration Worker Income Gap between Urban and Rural
JEL Classification: J61 O18 R11
沉淀资本和固定成本对市场进入均衡的综合影响
贺 磊
摘 要：沉淀资本可以构成市场进入壁垒，固定成本决定进入壁垒的有效性。本文综合考虑沉淀资本和固定成本对市场进入均衡的影响，通过建模分别对沉淀资本不贬值、小幅贬值及大幅贬值的情况进行讨论，总结了形成不同市场进入均衡——自然垄断、人造垄断及寡头垄断的具体条件，得出沉淀资本只能影响在位者的策略性行为，它通过固定成本间接影响市场进入均衡，而对于固定成本而言并非越大越容易形成市场进入壁垒，市场进入均衡的形式最终取决于沉淀资本和固定成本的综合作用。本文为判断垄断的具体形式提供理论依据，并对反垄断法的实施具有指导意义。
关键词：沉淀资本 固定成本 进入壁垒 进入均衡 策略性行为
Sunk Capital, Fixed Cost and Entry Equilibrium
Lei He
Abstract:Sunk capital contributes to entry barriers, and fixed cost determines the validity of entry barriers. This article discusses the comprehensive effects of sunk capital and fixed cost on the entry equilibrium in three different situations: no depreciation, little depreciation, and large depreciation of sunk capital, and concludes the specific conditions of entry equilibrium, which is divided into three kinds: natural monopoly, artificial monopoly and duopoly. The conclusion is made that the sunk capital can only affect the strategic behavior of the incumbent and has an impact on the entry equilibrium indirectly through fixed cost. It is not the fact that the fixed cost being larger the smaller probability entry is successful. The entry equilibrium depends on both of the sunk capital and the fixed cost. As a result, the theoretical basis of judging monopoly and the guidance of antitrust are supplied.
Keywords:Sunk Capital Fixed Cost Entry Barriers Entry Equilibrium Strategic Behavior
JEL Classification: L11 L12 L13
垂直一体化企业拆台行为研究综述
闫 威 党文珊 罗雨鹤
摘 要：当上游垄断企业兼并下游市场中的一个或多个企业组成垂直一体化企业时，一方面，该垂直一体化企业可以获取联合经济，节约成本；另一方面，它也有激励通过降低销售给下游独立企业的中间产品质量、延迟发货等拆台手段损害下游市场中独立企业的竞争能力，以获取更有利的竞争地位。文章基于相关文献对垂直一体化企业的拆台行为进行梳理：首先，从上游垄断企业的角度出发，分析价格管制以及下游子企业的规模及效率大小对垂直一体化决策的影响；然后概括总结了影响垂直一体化企业拆台行为的各种因素，并讨论了拆台行为对社会福利的影响；最后，结合企业竞争的实际提出了一些政策建议。
关键词：垂直一体化 拆台 社会福利
A Review on Sabotage Behavior of Vertical Integrated Provider
Wei Yan Wenshan Dang Yuhe Luo
Abstract：When upstream monopolist vertically integrates downstream, on the one hand, it can reap vertical economies and save costs; on the other hand, the vertically integrated provider (VIP) will have the incentive to delay the delivery or degrade the quality of access provided to independent rivals to damage the rivals’ competitiveness. Based on a series of literature, this article reviews the VIP’s sabotage activities. Firstly, we analyze the influences of price regulation and subsidiary’s scale and efficiency on upstream monopolist’s vertical integration choice. Secondly, we sum up the determinants of the VIP’s sabotage activity and discuss its social welfare effects. Some policy suggestions are also put forward in the last part based on the reality of enterprise competition.
Keywords:Vertical Integration Sabotage Social Welfare
JEL Classification: L13 L22
政治成本，代理成本与公司价值
冯旭南 李心愉 陈工孟
摘 要：本文以558家地方政府控制的上市公司为样本，研究国企改革过程中，政治成本和代理成本对公司价值有何影响，以及能否减轻这种影响。我们发现，较高的政府终极控制权对公司价值产生负面影响，这不仅为Frye & Shleifer（1997）的“掠夺之手理论”提供了证据，而且初步打开了“国有股影响企业绩效”（Shlefer，1998）的“黑匣子”。我们还发现，通过监督公司高层甚至解聘经营不善的董事长或CEO能够缓解代理成本的消极影响。更重要的是，治理环境的改善能够同时降低政治成本和代理成本，有利于国企改革的顺利进行。
关键词： 政治成本 代理成本 国企改革
Political Control, Agency Cost and Firm Value
Xunan Feng Xinyu Li Gongmeng Cheng
Abstract：Using data from the 558 local government controlled listed-firms, we study the impact of political control and agency cost on corporate valuation and how to mitigate such negative impact. We find that reducing the ultimate control rights can lessen the political control and that monitoring and even firing the management can mitigate the agency cost. Most importantly, improving the institutional environment can improve the value through lessening the political cost and agency cost.
Keywords：Political Control Agency Cost SOE Reform
JEL Classification：C21 G38 L25
FDI技术溢出效应：一个文献综述
杨晓静 刘国亮
摘 要：FDI技术溢出是国际技术转移和扩散的重要渠道，也是一国特别是发展中国家和地区实现技术进步的重要途径。本文在介绍FDI技术溢出机制和渠道的基础上，总结近年来关于FDI技术溢出效应的相关争议，并对争议存在的原因进行分析和解释，最后对现有研究进行了述评和展望，以期对发展中国家和地区利用FDI技术溢出实现技术进步和经济增长提供借鉴和参考。
关键词：FDI 技术溢出 R&D 吸收能力
FDI Technology Spillover Effect: A Literature Review
Xiaojing Yang Guoliang Liu
Abstract：FDI Technology Spillover is an important channel of international technology transfer and diffusion, as well as an important way for an economy——especially for developing countries and regions to achieve technological progress. This paper firstly introduces the mechanisms and channels of FDI technology spillover, then concludes the controversy about FDI technology spillover effect in recent years and analyzes the cause of the controversy, and finally carries on the review over the existing research and makes an outlook for further study, in order to provide reference for developing countries and regions to achieve technology progress and economic growth by making full use of FDI technology spillover effect.
Keywords：FDI Technology Spillover R&D Absorptive Capacity
JEL classification：F21 F23 O33
三维企业边界与多元化经营
——规模经济、范围经济和一体化战略的统一性
杜曙光 刘 刚
摘 要：企业最根本的决策是选择“生产什么，生产多少”，即企业的边界命题。就量化模型而言，关于“生产多少”的角点解，同时也是“生产什么”的最优解。企业生产决策的选择范围并不局限于某一条纵向产业链内部，跨越不同产业链的横向延伸成为企业边界治理的重要内容。局限于纵向产业链讨论企业与市场之间的替代关系，不能揭示企业边界演变的全部内涵。同时，交易成本不是决定企业边界的唯一因素，构建生产成本与交易成本相统一的分析框架是理论发展的必然趋势。在此基础上构建的三维企业边界模型说明，在传统研究中，战略层面的“纵向一体化—横向一体化”与“规模经济—范围经济”形成的“成本节约机制”在逻辑指向上呈“交错互补”关系，容易造成理论错位。将这些概念纳入三维企业边界模型统一的分析框架，不仅可以澄清相关理论错位，还可以综合生产资源和交易资源的影响，系统研究企业在专业化生产和多元化经营方面错综复杂的决策过程，揭示出众多尚未获得深入研究的理论空间。
关键词：三维企业边界 多元化经营 一体化 规模经济 范围经济
Three-Dimensional Enterprise Boundaries and Diversified Operation
──The Unity of Scale Economy, Scope Economy and Integration Strategy
Shuguang Du Gang Liu
Abstract: The most fundamental corporate decisions is to choose " what are produced, how much to produce ," that the corporate boundaries proposition. In terms of quantitative model, on the corner solution of " how much to produce " , also the optimal solution of "what are produced". The choice scope of enterprise production decision is not confined to one vertical industry chain inside, transverse stretching across different industry chain become the important content of enterprise boundary governance. Limited to the vertical industry chain to discuss the trade-off between enterprise and market, can not reveal all the meaning of enterprise boundary evolution. Meanwhile, the transaction cost is not the only factor in deciding the border, build the unity of the production cost and transaction cost analysis framework is inevitable trend in the development of the theory. On the basis of constructing the three-dimensional enterprise boundary model shows that in the traditional study, strategic level "vertical integration--horizontal integration" and " scale economy --scope economy" to form the "cost savings mechanism" on the logical point was " staggered complementary "relationships , likely to cause theory dislocation. These concepts into three-dimensional enterprise boundary model unified analysis framework, not only can clarify the dislocation of related theory , but also can be integrated the influence of productive resources and trade resources, system research enterprise in the specialized production and diversified complicated decision-making process, reveals many theoretical space that has yet to gain further study.
Keywords: Three-Dimensional Enterprise Boundarres Diversified Operation Integration Economy of Scale Economy of Scope
JEL Classification: L22 D21
中国石油产业福利损失测度——基于放松规制的视角
胡德宝 林 娜
摘 要：改革开放以来，中国石油产业的市场化程度逐步提高，然而由于存在过度规制，产业内的垄断态势并未降低，造成了大量的福利损失。对于垄断造成的福利损失的估算，前期已有大量的研究进行了测度。其中，阿罗和克鲁格曼对石油规制导致的福利损失的测度比较具有代表性。尽管行政垄断引致中国的石油规制具有特殊性，这些方法对中国仍然一定程度上适用。本文采用古诺博弈模型来对中国石油产业由于规制导致的福利损失进行实证研究。研究结果表明，我国由于过度规制导致了石油产业产生了大量的无谓损失，占到了营业收入的6%-7%。因此，降低我国石油产业的福利损失迫在眉睫，提高绩效应从放松规制入手。
关键词：经济规制 福利损失 放松规制 寡头垄断
Measurement of Welfare Loss to China’s Petroleum Industry —Perspective of Deregulation
Debao Hu Na Lin
Abstract:From reform and opening-up, the marketization level of China’s petroleum industry increases gradually. But for the sake of excessive regulation, monopolistic conditions in the industry have not been improved, which causes plenty of welfare losses. There were lots of previous studies on welfare loss cost by monopoly. In which, Arrow and Krugman’s pioneering studies of measurement to the welfare loss cost by petroleum industry regulation is typical. Although it is specific in China’s petroleum industry induced by administrative monopoly, but these methods are still fit for China. This paper takes Cournot duopoly model to evaluate welfare loss caused by regulation in China’s petroleum industry. The empirical result shows that excessive regulation causes lots of dead-weighted welfare loss, which accounts for 6 to 7 percent of main business income. Therefore, it is time to reduce the welfare loss in Chinese petroleum industry now, and deregulation is needed to improve industry performance.
Keywords:Economic Regulation Welfare Loss Deregulation Oligopoly
JEL Classification: C23 D43 L60 M38