需求扩张对产业市场结构的影响:中国生产性服务业的实证研究
陈艳莹 夏一平
摘 要:本文将行业的进入壁垒作为需求扩张对市场结构影响机制中的关键因素,分析了在进入壁垒水平不同的情况下,需求扩张对市场结构的不同影响。通过建立理论模型,发¬现较低的产业进入壁垒会加大需求扩张引起的产业集中度下降幅度,而且,在需求扩张的过程中,横向扩张会比纵向扩张更能导致企业生产规模的扩大和固定资产投资的增加,引起重复建设和资源浪费,造成社会福利的损失。以2004年至2008年我国生产性服务业12个行业面板数据为样本的实证研究也部分证明了上述结论。
关键词:需求扩张;市场结构;进入壁垒
The Impact of Market Expansion on Market Structure: An Empirical Research of Producer Services
Yanying Chen Yiping Xia
Abstract: This article considers the entry barrier as an important factor in the impacting process of market expansion on market structure. Under different level of entry barrier, market expansion will result differently. By modeling, we find that with lower level of entry barrier, market expansion will result a more competitive market structure easily, but not with higher level. Moreover, horizontal market expansion will more easily, than vertical market expansion, make the enterprises enlarge its production scale and raise the investment in fixed assets. That will also bring the issues of duplicated construction, wasting of resources, and even the lost of social welfare. Finally, the conclusion of the model is partly verified by using the data of 12 industries in Producer Services from 2004 to 2008.
Keywords:Market Expansion Market Structure Entry Barrier
JEL Classification:L1 L08
机制设计理论:一个综述
方 燕 张昕竹
摘 要:本文梳理重要概念及其独创的见解和应用。对机制的新理解和激励相容概念使得机制设计框架得以确立;显示原理及其拓展简化分析框架。公共品经济难以有效权衡配置效率、自愿参与和激励相容。在拟线性和一般经济环境下,公共品提供的占优策略均衡机制分别存在严格的帕累托无效或独裁。在贝叶斯环境下,公共品经济和私人品经济的帕累托效率与自愿参与可能难以兼容。对于公共品不兼容性在极限角度仍成立。纳什执行及其拓展试图使在所设机制下的所有均衡结果对于社会选择目标而都最优。最优简要梳理在拍卖和规制两应用领域的发展。尽管对称独立下的私人价值拍卖模型拓展及其理解研究成果丰硕,但是有些拓展的结论仍不明朗。最优规制机制分析及其拓展变革传统规制理论,促进规制机制评价和效应分析等方面的发展。
关键词:机制设计 社会选择规则 激励相容 显示原理 执行理论
A Survey on Mechanism Design Theory
Yan Fang Xinzhu Zhang
Abstract: The paper briefly combines fundamentals, concepts and applications in design mechanism. The new interpretation of mechanism and incentive compatibility notions laid foundation on framework of design mechanism theory. Revelation principle and its extensions greatly facilitate mechanism designing process. For public goods provision, it is of much difficulty in valid tradeoff between allocative efficiency, voluntary participation and incentive compatibility. Under quasi-linear and general environment, dominant equilibrium mechanism for public goods supply may lead to strictly paretoian inefficiency and dictatorship, respective. For public and private goods provisions, even in bayesian setting, pareto efficiency and voluntary participation tend to be incompatible. The incompatibility about public-goods provision is still valid for the limit perspective. Nash implementation and its extensions manage to make all the equilibrium outcomes in chosen mechanism optimal as for social choice function. Even though fruitful research extensively appeared about extensions for symmetric, independent, private- valued auction model (SIPV), results in some extensions of SIPV are ambiguous. The analysis and extensions of optimal regulatory mechanism transform traditionally regulatory theory, promoting the developments and understandings on regulations.
Keywords:Mechanism Design Social Choice Rule Incentive Compatibility Revelation Principle Implementation Theory
JEL Classification: C7 D82 N01
技术进步、产业结构与能源效率
——基于省域数据的空间面板计量分析
余泳泽 杜晓芬
摘 要:本文运用空间面板计量方法研究了全要素生产率、产业结构调整与能源效率的关系,并从中探求我国能源效率低下的深层原因。实证研究的结果表明:全要素生产率与产业结构变化共带动中国能源效率提高了近50%,占能源效率总提升的3/4。全要素生产率提高对能源效率贡献明显高于产业结构变化。其中,技术进步率为全要素生产率的1/3,但对能源效率贡献却占了3/4,居于主导地位;虽然规模效率比重近1/2,但对能源效率贡献只有1/6,技术效率比重和贡献都较低。全要素生产率对能源效率提升贡献呈现了一定的“中国特色”和认识误区,政府想通过兼并重组、淘汰落后产能,提升规模效率进而提高能源效率的政策并没有从根本上改变能源效率的现状。由于第三产业比重在2000年后长期维持在40%的水平,并且工业产业结构仍处于全球价值链的中低端,单位产品能耗仍较高,产业结构调整对能源效率提升的贡献有限。地方政府“GDP”数据锦标赛和我国长期形成的经济增长方式使得我国能源效率面临较大的压力。
关键词:全要素生产率;产业结构;能源效率;空间面板模型
Technological Progress, Industrial Structure and Energy Efficiency
——Based on Spatial Econometrics of Panel Data with Provincial Data
Yongze Yu Xiaofen Du
Abstract: This paper analyses the relationship between TFP, industrial structure and energy efficiency in China by spatial econometrics of panel data. The result of empirical study shows: The add of TFP and industrial structure has taken China’s energy efficiency increase about 50% percentage, which make up of 3/4 of energy efficiency’s amplification. TFP is more obviously than industrial structure. Technological progress accounted for 1 / 3 in TFP, but enhances energy efficiency about 3/4. Scale efficiency accounted for 1/2 in TFP, but only enhances energy efficiency about 1/6. The proportion and contribution of technical efficiency are low. The contribution of TFP in enhancing energy efficiency presents some "Chinese characteristics" and the misunderstanding. The Government wants to enhance scale efficiency and thus improve energy efficiency through mergers and acquisitions and eliminate backward production capacity, but the policy does not fundamentally change the problem of energy efficiency. As the proportion of tertiary industry is long-term maintenance the level of 40%, and the industrial structure is still in the low of global value chains, the unit energy consumption is still high, so industrial structure adjustment is limited to the contribution of energy efficiency improvement. Local government "GDP" data Championship and our long-term economic growth in a way make the energy efficiency in China face greater pressure.
Keywords:TFP Industrial Structure Energy Efficiency Spatial Panel Data Model
JEL Classification: O13 Q48
“中等收入陷阱”的理论解释
伍业君 张其仔
摘 要:本文构建了一个基于比较优势演化的产业升级模型,从产业升级的角度解释了“中等收入陷阱”的形成机理,分析了经济体进入中等收入阶段后容易陷入陷阱的原因。本文的主要结论是:进入中等收入水平后由于成本上升及创新的难度等原因,经济体容易发生产业升级断档,这是经济出现增长停滞甚至衰退的根本原因。此外,本文得出了产业升级发生的必要条件,必要条件的满足使得企业实现产业升级跳跃距离的临界值变小,这增加了产业升级断档的风险,进而增加了经济增长停滞、陷入“中等收入陷阱”的可能性。
关键词:中等收入陷阱 产业升级 比较优势演化
The Theoretical Explanation of the Middle-Income Trap
Yejun Wu Qizi Zhang
Abstract:A model of industrial upgrading based on the comparative advantage evolution is built. It explains the formation of the middle income trap from the view of industrial upgrading and analyzes why the trap is easily emerged when the economy is in the middle-income stage. The result shows that high cost in the middle income stage is the fundamental cause for the difficulties of industrial upgrading which leads to industrial upgrading suspension and sluggish economy growth. What’s more, this paper calculates the necessary condition of industrial upgrading, but the satisfaction of the necessary condition shortens the jump critical value needed to realize the upgrading, which increases the possibility of suspending as well as the possibility of growth sluggish and be trapped.
Keywords: Middle income trap; Industrial upgrading; Comparative advantage evolution
JEL Classification:D21 L16 O12
斯坦克尔伯格竞争下厂商先动和后动的决策机理
——“病猫扮老虎”和“老虎变病猫”的经济学分析
王志刚 朱艺云
摘 要: 根据经典的斯坦克尔伯格数量博弈,先行进入市场的厂商总是可以抢先占领一系列诸如市场需求空间和上下游渠道等资源,并在消费者购买和品牌塑造上占据优势。但是,事实上依据其成本的大小并不是所有抢先进入市场的厂商都会如此。本文以经典的斯坦克尔伯格竞争模型为基础,引入成本-利润差曲线,深入考察了成本对厂商先后动的影响机理。本文的主要贡献在于,确定了厂商先后动的临界成本点和成本区间,确立了在不同成本结构下高成本厂商的先动和低成本厂商的后动策略理论,丰富和扩展了对现有斯坦克尔伯格竞争模型的理解。
关键词: 先动 后动 斯坦克尔伯格竞争 生产成本 收益
Firm’s Decision-Making Mechanism of First-Mover and Second-Mover under Stackelberg Oligopoly Competition: Economic Analysis of “The Sick Cat Dresses Up as the Tiger” and “The Tiger Plays The Role of The Sick Cat”
Zhigang Wang Yiyun Zhu
Abstract: According to the classical Stackelberg game theory, the manufacturers who enter the market first can always be possible in advance to seize a series of resources .For example, the market demand and the upstream and downstream channel and so on. Moreover, the first-mover can also occupy the superiority in the consumer behavior preferences and becoming the leading brand. However, because of the differences of the cost structures, in fact, not all the manufacturers which act firstly can get the advantages as what said above. The purpose of this article is to analyze the influence mechanism how the cost structures affect the market decision of the manufacturers. This paper’s major contribution is to confirm the critical cost point and cost structure interval, establishing first-mover theory of leader under higher cost and follower under lower cost, enriching and expanding the understanding of the Stackelberg oligopoly game theory that exists now.
Keywords:First-Mover Second-Mover Stackelberg Competition Cost Profit
JEL Classification:C62 L11
产业迁移后城市环境政策与土地利用的最优化分析
----基于非单一中心空间构造
綦勇 田海峰 孙广生
摘 要:针对在中国城市发展中出现的产业迁移现象,以产业迁移后一种可能的非单一中心城市空间构造为研究对象,分析居民的福利水平变化和社会福利最大化的实现条件以及影响因素。本研究基于土地利用、交通、环境等空间要素一体化的视角,将空间要素的相互依存关系考虑在城市经济学模型中。在比较静态分析的基础上,提出:对工业企业实施选址规制、为服务企业劳动雇佣提供补助金以及对污染排放征收环境税等措施必须同时进行才能实现社会福利最大化;社会福利最大化的企业选址、环境税以及补助金的最优确定条件。
关键词:产业迁移;分区规制;环境政策;土地利用;社会福利最大化
Optimization Analysis on Environmental Policies and Land Use in Chinese Cities after Industrial Relocation: Based on Nonmonocentric City Structure
Yong Qi Haifeng Tian Guangsheng Sun
Abstract:The paper focuses on the phenomenon which has taken place in Chinese large cities that more and more industrial firms are moved outside urban area to improve the environmental condition. The effects of relocation policy on the spatial configuration patterns are investigated in a nonmonocentric city. Comparative static analysis shows that the social optimum can be also achieved by undertaking such a relocation policy, levying a tax on the quantity of industrial emissions and giving laborers working at office firms a subsidy that is equal to the land rent increase in the agricultural sector due urbanization simultaneously. Optimal locations and taxes are also analyzed in the study.
Keywords: Industrial Relocation Zoning Regulation Environmental Policies Land Use Social Optimum
JEL Classification: H23 R13 R14
国外海洋产业技术创新战略联盟的最新发展动向与启示
丁娟 王鑫
摘 要:技术创新战略联盟是企业为增强自主创新能力,以联合方式开发新产品、新技术从而开拓市场的一种新的竞争模式。目前,世界各国对经济资源的获取已经从陆地向海洋领域拓展,由于海洋资源的不可分性和投入的巨大性,国外涉海大企业普遍采用国际技术创新战略联盟的方式进行海洋技术开发,以降低创新成本、以更快的速度增强自己技术实力,占领市场,比较突出的表现在在海洋油气业和海洋船运业。而国内海洋经济领域自2009年开始也陆续出现组建技术创新战略联盟的构想和实践。本文对国外近些年海洋经济领域的技术创新战略联盟的产业分布、操作模式、成功案例和特点进行了深入分析,以期对我国海洋经济领域的技术创新战略联盟实践起到参考与借鉴作用。
关键词:海洋经济 技术创新战略联盟 发展动向
The Latest Development And Enlightenment of International Strategic Innovation Alliance in Marine Industries
Juan Ding Xin Wang
Abstract:Strategic innovation alliance is a new mode of competition for organizations to strengthen the independent innovation for the new market by joint R&D. Many countries intend to obtain economic resources from ocean area than land. In order to lower innovative cost and occupy market earlier, many foreign ocean-related enterprises established strategic alliance to strengthen innovation capability, especially in the field of offshore oil & gas industry and liner shipping industry. It was not until 2009 that domestic oceanic enterprises began the practice of establishing and joining strategic alliance. This paper made an in-depth analysis about industry distribution, operational modes, successful cases and characters of the ocean technology related strategic alliance, hoping to provide some references and enlightenment for the practices of domestic ocean-related strategic alliance.
Keywords:Marine Industry Strategic Innovation Alliance Latest Development
JEL Classification: F23 L72
中美国际贸易契约安排与交易博弈
——基于不同历史时期的政策分析
张 贵 刘翠霞 郭亚静
摘 要:中美双边贸易的竞争成为国际市场格局的显著特征。本文引入契约安排来深入研究中美双边贸易,将国家贸易政策作为国际贸易的内生变量,将中美企业的契约策略行为上升为国家贸易政策之间的博弈行为,从美国四个不同历史时期的不同贸易政策的博弈策略,认为美国为了维护自己国家和企业利益,在不同时期不断地对中国提出新的要价,而且有越来越激烈的趋势,美国也将从这种贸易博弈中继续获利。同时,本文结合实际情况重新审视了中美国际贸易博弈的最终结果,强调美国必须采取理性贸易政策,只有这样才能不会将两国间的贸易博弈升级,才能为中美贸易进一步发展创造一个平稳顺畅的发展空间。
关键词:中美国际贸易 契约安排 交易博弈 贸易政策
The Contract Arrangements and Game of Sion-US trade-based on the Trade Policy Analysis of Different Historical Periods
Gui Zhang Cuixia Liu Yajing Guo
Abstracts: Bilateral trade competitions between China and America have been salient features of the international market. From the angle of the contract arrangements,this paper goes into the bilateral trades between China and the United States. The strategic behaviors of China and American enterprises can be seen as the game behaviors of the national trade policies between China and the United States, when the national trade policies are taken as endogenous variables of the international trades. In the strategic trade policies of different historical periods, the United States constantly put forward the new price to China, which did well to American interests and will continue .The situation of trade friction is more and more fierce. At the same time, combining with the actual situations, the paper reviews the game result of the Sion-US trade. It is stressed that the United States must adopt rational trade policies. Only in this way, will the trade game between the two countries not upgrade and can a stable smooth development space be created for the further development of the Sino-US trade.
Keywords: Sino-US Trade Contract Arrangements Trade Game Trade Policy
JET Classification: E61 F13 L16
寡头垄断市场的开放与福利---兼论开放经济中的竞争政策
刘 莉 黄建忠
摘 要:并购的加剧强化了世界范围内的寡头垄断经济格局。本文使用古诺模型,探讨了寡头垄断市场开放中反竞争行为出现的可能和条件,及对开放国福利的影响。通过模型的演绎,可以得出以下结论:进入一个存在反竞争联盟的东道国市场对外资来说更有利;反竞争联盟制定的价格水平与该国的壁垒高低相关;在东道国贸易壁垒从高位降低的渐次有限开放过程中,最易发生国际化的反竞争联盟,此时该国的福利水平最低;只有在竞争能够保证的情况下,寡头垄断市场的开放后福利水平才会绝对提高。因此,运用竞争政策对反竞争行为进行防范和规制,是寡头垄断市场增进开放福利的必要条件。
关键词:寡头市场;开放;反竞争联盟;福利;贸易壁垒
Oligopolistic Market Liberalization and Social Welfare – And On Competition Policy in Open Economies
Li Liu Jianzhong Huang
Abstract:Increasing mergers and acquisitions strengthen the worldwide oligopolistic structure. This article uses Cournot model to discuss the possibility and conditions of anti-competitive practices as well as country’s welfare in oligopolistic market liberalization. We can draw the following conclusions. As for a foreign capital, it is more favorable to enter a host country with anti-competitive alliance. The price of the anti-competitive alliance is related to the trade barriers. International anti-competitive alliance is mostly appearing during trade barriers reduced from a high level gradually. The oligopolistic market opening will definitely increase welfare only in case of competition being ensured. Therefore, to prevent anti-competitive practices is necessary for oligopolistic market liberalization.
Keywords: Oligopolistic Market; Liberalization; Anti-competitive alliance;Welfare; Trade barriers
JEL Classification: F12 L20