信誉、市场结构与产品质量——文献综述
杜 创
摘要:当消费者和厂商对于产品质量存在不对称信息时,厂商的品牌和信誉就至关重要;而在不同的市场结构里,厂商维持信誉的激励是不同的。本文从市场结构的角度综述了关于体验品市场上信誉机制的国外理论文献:首先通过分析一个简单的重复博弈模型,揭示了各个市场结构中信誉机制的相同之点;然后不断放松模型设定,分别介绍了垄断市场、垄断竞争市场和寡头市场上的信誉机制。本文尤其关注最近几年中信誉理论的新进展,如关于垄断者信誉的暂时性、寡头市场上的“周转均衡”机制等。
关键词:信誉 市场结构 体验品 质量
Reputation, Market Structure and Product Quality: A Survey
Du Chuang
Abstract: Firms’ brand and reputation are important when information about product quality is asymmetrically distributed between consumers and firms. And firms have different incentives to maintain reputation in different market structure. In this paper I survey the theoretical literature on reputation mechanism for experience goods markets from the point of view of market structure. First, common features of reputation mechanisms in different market structures are revealed by a simple repeated games model. Then theoretical literature on reputation mechanisms in monopolistic, oligopolistic and monopolistically competitive markets is introduced respectively by loosing assumptions in the basic model one after another. The emphasis of the paper is on the development of related theory in recent years, such as impermanent reputation in monopolistic market and turnover equilibrium in oligopolistic market, etc.
Keywords: Reputation, Market Structure, Experience Goods, Quality
JEL Classification: D21, D40, D80
基于机会损益的双向接入定价政府规制分析
姜春海
摘要:网络产业放松规制、引入竞争的改革使得“瓶颈”环节和竞争性环节出现“业务分离”,从而催生出“接入问题”,并成为网络产业规制改革能否成功和有效竞争的关键。在多瓶颈情况下,不同网络企业之间必须实现双向接入才能正常运营。本文有别于以往从合谋角度分析是否应该对双向接入定价进行政府规制的思路,利用接入机会损益分析方法,构建了接入收益分配模型,从接入收益分配角度分析双向接入定价政府规制的必要性。分析结果表明,双向接入有助于提高全网价值。但对小网络价值提高较大,对大网络价值提高较小;若不进行双向接入,小网络的机会损益率要高于大网络;理论上,主导在位企业有理由要求进行不对等结算。
关键词:网络产业 双向接入 接入定价 政府规制
The Analysis of Two-Way Access Pricing Regulation in Network IndustriesBased on the Opportunity to Profit and Loss
Jiang Chunhai
Abstract:The reforms of deregulation and introduction of competition in network Industries made it possible that “business segmentation” appeared in the “bottleneck” links and competitive links, thus engendering the “access pricing”, which becomes the key to the regulatory reforms in network industries and to the effective competition. In multi-bottleneck cases, different networks must be based on two-way access to achieve normal operations. This article is different from the previous analysis which is from the perspective of collusion to make sure the two-way access pricing need be regulated by the government, it constructs the model of income distribution in use of the profit and loss analysis to make sure the two-way access pricing need be regulated by the government. The results show that two-way access pricing increases the value of the whole network, and a larger increase happens in small networks, a smaller increase happens in large networks.If we do not use two-way access pricing, the small networks loses more than large networks based on the same profit.In theory, the leading power companies have reason to request unequal settlement.
Keywords: Network Industries; Two-Way Access; Access Pricing; Government Regulation
JEL classification: D43; L13; L51; L96
基于电信重组后新市场格局下网间互联的非合作博弈分析
陶长琪 常贵阳
摘 要:立足于我国新一轮电信重组后形成的市场格局,结合我国电信网间互联质量低下的现实,本文对我国电信网间互联的问题进行探讨。通过设计一个两阶段博弈模型,本文分析指出,运营商在非合作的情况下进行互联博弈,(不联通,不联通)形成一个占优战略均衡,而且当某个运营商的市场份额高达一定的值时,纳什均衡(不联通,不联通)是帕雷托有效的;当运营商网络资源相差不大时,纳什均衡(不联通,不联通)不再是帕雷托有效的,局势(联通,联通)是对纳什均衡(不联通,不联通)进行帕累托改进的结果,同时,这个局势也意味着社会福利最大。进一步的分析发现,当运营商的市场份额相等时,局势(联通,联通)的稳定性最强。进而指出政府的管制目标是促进合作局势(联通,联通)的形成,并通过平衡市场力量,设计罚款机制等措施保证其稳定性。
关键词:互联互通;电信;博弈;政府管制
Game Analysis of Telecom Network Interconnection Under the New Market Structure
Tao Changqi Chang Guiyang
Abstract: Based on the market structure formed in the new round of reconstruction, combining with the fact of low quality of the telecom network interconnection, this paper makes an analysis on the problems of the telecom network interconnection. By designing a two stages game model, this paper points out that in non-cooperative game, (disconnect, disconnect) forms a dominance equilibrium and when an operator’s market share is up to a certain value, the equilibrium (disconnect, disconnect) is pareto-effective. When operators’ network resource is almost the same, the equilibrium (disconnect, disconnect) is no longer pareto-effective. (Connect, connect) is the pareto improving result of (disconnect, disconnect) and at the same time it means the maximum social welfare. Further analysis finds that when operaters’ market shares equal, (connect, connect) has the strongest stability. And it is further pointed out that the regulation aim of government is to promote the formation of (connect, connect) and by balancing the market power, designing the penalty mechanism ect to guarantee its stability.
Keywords:Interconnection; Telecommunication; Game; Government regulation
JEL Classification:D01, D52, D86.
电视观众收视行为的经验分析——基于北京电视收视市场
池建宇
摘要:本文建立一个计量模型对电视观众的收视行为进行估计,进而说明观众对各类节目类型的偏好程度。利用北京市场的一周收视数据,我们的估计结果表明:电视剧等几种节目类型的总体收视率显著高于其他类型的电视节目。因此,相对于其他节目类型,观众可能更偏好电视剧。另外,观众的年龄和受教育程度对他们的偏好有重要影响。
关键词:收视率 水平差别 观众偏好
An Empirical Study of Television Audiences’ Viewing Behaviors
--Based on Beijing Audience Market
Chi Jianyu
Abstract: I present an econometric model to estimate television audiences’ viewing behaviors, which indicates viewer preferences to program types. Given my estimates, I find that television play has higher rating than other program types. Therefore viewers prefer play to other types. In addition, demographic characters, such as age, educational level, have significant influence on viewer preferences.
Keywords:Rating Horizontal differentiation Preference
JEL Classification: L82 L13 D11
产业集群治理逻辑:一个分析框架
李世杰 李凯
摘要:作为介于纯市场与企业科层之间的“中间性组织”,产业集群内洽了契约属性,是由众多成员基于分工—交易关系构建起来的契约网络,集群成员之间的契约指向是对集群剩余的控制与分配。由于集群契约的不完备性,集群成员出于自身利益最大化的动机,往往会采取机会主义行为。集群治理需要借助一系列激励机制和约束制度安排,降低集群成员的机会主义倾向,使得成员之间高效协作、有序竞争,维持产业集群的稳定存在和持续发展。本文研究发现,集群剩余的创造是集群治理的物质基础和激励根源,其市场化分配过程形成对集群成员的有效激励;而“声誉”则构成了产业集群内生约束机制,限制集群成员机会主义倾向。
关键词:产业集群;契约;集群治理;集群剩余;机会主义
The Analytical Logical of Governance of the Industrial Clusters:A Framework
Li Shijie Li Kai
Abstract: As a kind of inter-firm organization between company stratum and simple-market. The industrial clusters embed the characteristics of the contract, which are contract network composed by lots of members basing the relationship of division and transaction. The aim of the contract relationship among the members is to control clusters residual and participate in distribution. As to the faulty of the contract, the clusters’ members tend to take opportunistic measures to maximize their benefits. The goal of the industrial clusters governance is to reduce the opportunistic trend and maintain the stabilization and development of the industrial clusters via serials of inspiration mechanism and restriction mechanism. The paper finds that clusters residual is the foundation and resource, which engenders effective inspiration during the distribution of benefits; meanwhile, the creditability among the members is the restriction mechanism, which restrict the opportunistic trend.
Keywords:Industrial Clusters;Contract;Clusters Governance;Clusters Residual;Opportunism
JEL Classification: R58 L22 L16
规制概念的再认识
刘 轩 平力群
摘要:规制是指在市场经济条件下,政府等公共机构基于一定的法律法规对某些具有自然垄断性、网络性等特点的特定产业或经济领域的微观经济主体直接采取的限制性行为或活动。规制本质上是一种政府管理行为,它具有一定的强制约束性、制度依赖性、有限理性、成本效益性和规制主体约束性等特征。
关键词:规制 有限理性 成本效益性 主体约束性
Rethinking the Concept of Regulation
Liu Xuan Ping Liqun
Abstract: Regulation refers to the Government and other public institutions carry restrictions based on certain laws and regulations on the some specific industries or microeconomic entities in specific economic areas characteristics of natural monopoly or network in the condition of market economy. Regulation is essentially a kind of government action, which has certain amount of mandatory binding, institutional dependent, and limited rationality, cost-effectiveness and binding to the main characteristics of the regulation subject.
Keywords: Regulation Limited Rationality Cost-Effectiveness Actors Bound
JEL Classification: L51 L41 H11 K21
FDI、金融市场与经济增长:地区差异及门槛效应
綦建红 魏庆广 鞠 磊
摘 要:国内外实践表明,FDI对经济增长的促进作用远非人们所预想的那样乐观。究其原因,金融市场在二者之间中介作用的发挥,是需要考量的前提条件之一。本文首先采用我国1992-2007年的相关面板数据,对我国FDI影响经济增长的地区差异进行测度。结果表明,与中西部地区相比,东部地区FDI对经济增长的促进作用最为明显。在利用DEA方法测度各省市金融市场效率的基础上,非线性门槛面板回归的结果则进一步表明,金融市场运行效率的高低关系到FDI的经济增长促进作用,即只有当金融市场运行效率跨越门槛值时,FDI才能有效地促进经济增长。
关键词:FDI 经济增长 金融市场 门槛面板
FDI, Financial Market and Economic Growth:
Regional Differences and Threshold Effect
Qi Jianhong Wei Qingguang Ju Lei
Abstract:The research both at home and abroad indicates that the promotion of FDI to economic growth is not as optimistic as we ever imagined. So the effect of financial market between FDI and economic growth becomes focus of attention. This paper firstly carries out empirical analysis on the regional differences of FDI on economic growth by applying the panel data of China from 1992 to 2007, and the result shows that FDI of the East Region promotes economic growth most significantly, comparing with the Middle and West Regions. Basing on the efficiency of financial market measured by DEA method, the outcome of non-linear threshold panel regression further demonstrates that, the efficiency of financial market plays an important role with respect to the effect of FDI on economic growth. That is to say, only when efficiency of financial market gets across the threshold can FDI promote economic growth significantly.
Keywords:FDI Economic Growth Financial Market Threshold Panel
JEL Classification:F43 L16 G29
市场结构与厂商产品创新动机研究
—Cournot v.s. Bertrand
高建刚
摘要:以往探讨厂商创新动机和市场结构的文献,通常假定厂商创新为工艺创新,结论一般为厂商数目和厂商创新动机之间成单调的负向关系,即厂商数目越多,厂商创新动机越弱。改变以往文献厂商进行工艺创新的假设,在市场上只有一家厂商能够进行小幅产品创新的假设下,分析厂商创新动机和市场结构(厂商数目)的关系,结论发现:在Bertrand竞争下,若厂商之间产品同质性较高,则厂商数目与厂商研发动机成单调负向关系;若产品差异性越高,则厂商研发动机与厂商数目成倒型关系,即厂商研发动机随着厂商数目增加先递增后递减。在Cournot竞争下,无论产品差异大小,厂商研发动机与厂商数目均为倒型关系。
关键词:市场结构 产品创新 Bertrand竞争 Cournot竞争 倒 型关系
Analysis of the Relation between Market Structure and Product Innovation
Gao Jiangang
Abstract:The past papers on the relation between market structure and product innovation usually assumed that innovation of firm to be process innovation, as a result, the conclusion that the monotonic negative relation between them would be drawn. Changing the above hypothesis, assuming product innovation is invested in by firm. Only one firm has the capability to invest in product innovation. We show that,under Bertrand competition, when products are highly homogeneous, the incentive of innovation and the number of firms have monotonic negative relation; when products are greatly heterogeneous, the incentive of innovation and the number of firms is an inverted U-shaped relation.
Keywords:Market structure product innovation Bertrand (cournot)competition Inverted U-shaped relation
JEL Classification:O31 D43 D52
收入不平等、有效需求与技术进步
李 平 刘廷华
摘要:关于收入不平等与技术进步关系的研究大都侧重于技术进步对收入不平等的影响,反向的研究较少。本文在检讨相关文献的基础上,总结了收入差距对技术进步可能存在的间接影响机制,并以中国1999-2007年31个工业行业的面板数据为例,实证检验收入差距对内资行业技术进步的影响。结果显示收入差距会间接地影响技术进步:收入分配不均不利于研发投入的增加,阻碍技术进步;过大的收入差距阻碍外来技术的进入,进而不利于内资行业的技术进步。
关键词:收入不平等 有效需求 技术进步 系统GMM
Income Inequality,Effective Demand and Technological Progress
Li Ping Liu Tinghua
Abstract:The studies of the relationship between income inequality and technological progress mostly focus on the effect of technological progress on income inequality, and the reverse link has rarely attracted attention. Based on the related literature, we analyze the possible indirect effecting mechanism of inequality on technological progress, and then we test it empirically with Chinese industrial panel data from 1999 to 2007. The result shows that income inequality can indirectly affect technological progress: income inequality is not conductive to the increasing of R&D input, impeding the technological progress; it neither conductive to the entry of foreign t, restraining the technological progress of capital industry.
Keywords: income inequality effective demand technological progress system GMM
JEL Classification: O15 L60
我国省区产业集聚:类型特征与形成机制
赵 祥
摘要:本文从专业化和总量集聚水平两个维度分析了我国省区产业集聚的类型与特征,将全国省区产业集聚划分为高专业化、高集聚,高专业化、低集聚,低专业化,高集聚,以及低专业化、低集聚四种类型。在类型划分的基础上,本文还对我国省区产业集聚的形成机制进行了分地区检验,发现要素禀赋条件、市场规模效应、集聚效应和资源流动成本对不同类型地区产业集聚的作用存在明显的差异,而区际要素和商品流动性高低不同的组合是造成这种差异的深层次原因,并导致我国不同类型地区产业集聚的形成机制有所不同。
关键词:产业集聚、专业化、总量集聚、商品流动性、要素流动性
Provincial Industrial Agglomeration in China: Difference on the Patterns and Causes
Zhao Xiang
Abstract: Based on the two dimensions of specialization and aggregate scale, provincial industrial agglomeration in China can be divided into followed four patterns: (1)model of high specialization and aggregate scale;(2)model of high specialization and low aggregate scale; (3) model of low specialization and high aggregate scale; (4) model of low specialization and aggregate scale. By using the provincial panel data of 1998-2006 of industries, this paper explores the cause of industrial agglomeration of different model, and finds that natural resources, market scale effect, agglomeration effect and inter-regional transaction cost play different roles in different regions. The diffenrence of inter-region mobility of commoditiy and factor determines the patterns and characteristics of provincial industrial agglomeration in China.
Keywords: Industrial Agglomeration; Specialization; Aggregate scale; Commodity mobility; Factor mobility
JEL Classification:L20 R11
基于因子分析的东北地区电子信息产业创新绩效评价
王立成 李晓梅
摘 要:促进电子信息产业发展对振兴东北地区老工业基地有着紧迫的现实意义。本文以市场因子、技术因子、社会动力因子为基本要素,构建了影响东北地区电子信息产业创新绩效的理论模型,实证对比分析了东北地区与长三角地区和珠三角地区电子信息产业的创新绩效差距,并以此为基础提出了提升东北地区电子信息产业创新绩效的对策建议。
关键词:电子信息产业 创新绩效评价 市场因子 技术因子 社会动力因子
Innovation’s Performance Evaluation of Northeast China’s Electronics Information Industry Based-on Factor Analysis
Wang Licheng Li Xiaomei
Abstract:Promoting the development of electronics information industry is of vital importance for Northeast China to revive its old industrial base. Composed of market, technology and social dynamic factors, this article established a theoretical model of influencing Northeast China’s electronics information industry’s innovation, then empirically analyzed the gap of innovation’s performance among Northeast China, Yangtze River Delta region and Zhujiang Triangle Region. Finally, based on these results, some suggestions and countermeasures were put forward for enhancing the innovation’s performance of Northeast China’s electronics and information industry.
Keywords: electronics information industry; innovation’s performance evaluation; market factor; technology factor; social dynamic factor
JEL Classification: D21 L63 O32